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REASONED EXPLANATION AND
IRS ADJUDICATION
STEVE R. JOHNSON†
ABSTRACT
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an administrative
action can be invalidated as arbitrary and capricious if the agency
fails to sufficiently explain the reasons for its choices. This principle
applies to agency adjudication as well as to agency rulemaking. How
does this principle apply to IRS adjudications? Examining five
paradigms of IRS decisionmaking, this Article first establishes that the
IRS does engage in APA–style adjudication. The Article then
examines tax-specific explanation requirements and asks whether a
more robust explanation duty patterned on the APA should be
imposed on IRS determinations. Based on a variety of legal and
prudential considerations, the Article concludes that such an
additional duty generally is not advisable as to IRS assessment
determinations (that is, the amount of tax liability owed) but may be
useful as to IRS collection determinations (that is, when and how to
proceed with enforced collection after assessment).
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INTRODUCTION
1

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) clearly applies to the
2
Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Nonetheless, for generations, tax lawyers and administrators were
slow to acknowledge the applicability of general administrative law to
tax. Their attitudes toward this applicability (or intrusion, as some
viewed it) ranged from outright denunciation to guerilla warfare to
3
(most commonly) neglect, indifference, and disregard.
Those days are gone. Recent decisions by the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts have made it undeniable that administrative
4
law applies to tax. Tax lawyers and administrators are being
dragged—some kicking and screaming, some in grudging
resignation—into this realization.
To say that administrative law applies to tax, however, leaves
open important questions as to just how it applies in particular
circumstances. Administrative law is about nuance, and it must be
adapted to the issues, agencies, and circumstances of the particular
5
situation at hand. “[T]he intensity of the court’s supervisory role

1. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012).
2. See id. § 551(1) (defining “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the United
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency,” subject to some
exceptions not relevant here); Comm’r v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (Tjoflat, J.,
dissenting) (“I begin by stating the obvious: the IRS is an ‘agency’ as defined by the APA, the
IRS has made findings of fact in this case, and such findings constitute ‘agency action.’”); U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT 9–10 (1947) (explaining the APA’s definition of the word “agency”).
3. For decades, occasional (and not always very good) discussions of administrative-law
issues have popped up in tax decisions, but they have typically made only fleeting impressions in
tax lawyers’ minds. See, e.g., Redhouse v. Comm’r, 728 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1984); Am.
Med. Ass’n v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 358, 363–66 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev’d on other grounds,
887 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1989); Nat’l Rest. Ass’n v. Simon, 411 F. Supp. 933, 999 (D.D.C. 1976);
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889, 895 (D.D.C. 1974); Estate of Gardner v.
Comm’r, 82 T.C. 989, 994 (1984); Wing v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 17, 27–32 (1983); Wendland v.
Comm’r, 79 T.C. 355, 379–82 (1982); Dittler Bros. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 896, 909 (1979), aff’d, 642
F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1981).
4. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712–
14 (2011); Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Intermountain Ins. of
Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211, 236–48 (2010) (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., concurring in the
result), rev’d, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012). For a discussion of
Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011), see
generally Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA.
TAX REV. 269 (2012).
5. Cf., e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527–33 (2004) (displaying sensitivity to
context in applying administrative law to military operations); Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472,
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6

[over agencies] varies with context.” This reality pervades
7
administrative law generally, including the celebrated, yet
8
challenging, arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Part of the challenge
of “Taking Administrative Law to Tax” is the cultural difference
between this fluidity of administrative law and the relatively greater
9
determinacy of tax.
This Article involves one of these second-generation issues.
General administrative law, through the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard, insists that agencies give reasoned explanations for their
actions. This requirement “has come to play a central role in judicial
10
review of agency decisions.” How should it apply in the tax context?
Administrative-law authority and commentary—conveniently,
though somewhat imprecisely—train principal attention on agencies’
quasi-legislation through promulgation of regulations and agencies’

482–83 (1995) (to prison administration); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908) (to
revenue raising).
6. Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or “The Deciders”—The Courts in Administrative Law, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 817 (2008).
7. As Professors Richard Levy and Robert Glicksman have observed,
[A]dministrative law doctrine necessarily reflects the interaction between agencyspecific law . . . and generally applicable law, such as the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). . . . [A]gencies have differing organic statutes and administer different
regulatory and benefit programs, so some degree of variation is implicit in
administrative law doctrine. . . . [Indeed,] the universality of administrative law
doctrine may not be as pervasive as is commonly assumed.
Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 500
(2011); see also Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right
Direction?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1145, 1161 (2004) (“[T]he extent of external constraints on agency
discretion generally varies with the nature of the decision and the type of interest
involved . . . .”); Kristin E. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or
Deliberate Strategy, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 89, 89 (2011) (“Given the diversity of
organizational structures, practices, and goals among federal government agencies, is there or
should there be a body of general principles labeled administrative law?”).
8. See Strauss, supra note 6, at 821 (“‘Arbitrary [or] capricious’ has one meaning for a
court reviewing congressional judgments in enacting legislation, another for a court reviewing
an agency’s decision to adopt a high-consequence regulation, another for a court reviewing an
agency’s judgment to forego rulemaking it has been petitioned to undertake, and another for
review of the products of informal adjudications in relatively low-consequence matters . . . .”
(first alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
9. Cf. Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1403 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“[T]he Administrative Procedure Act is not the tax code. [Administrative-law]
cases . . . provide rules of thumb, general principles meant to guide interpretation, not rigid rules
that narrowly confine it.”).
10. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch:
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987
DUKE L.J. 387, 388.
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quasi-adjudication through decisions in particular cases. This Article
focuses on the reasoned-explanation requirement as applied to tax
12
adjudication by the IRS. It is the first to address the reasonedexplanation requirement across multiple dimensions of IRS
adjudication.
The iconic dimension of IRS adjudication involves the IRS’s
issuance of a notice of deficiency, which usually is a prerequisite to its
13
assessment of deficiencies of income, estate, and gift taxes. The
traditional, strongly asserted view is that APA–style, reasoned14
explanation review is unavailable for notices of deficiency. But the
seminal cases standing for this position were decided before the
enactment of the APA, and more recent cases have not reexamined
IRS adjudication in light of the APA. Commentators have argued
that the reasoned-explanation requirement should attach to IRS
15
deficiency determinations, either broadly or narrowly. Moreover, a
number of circuit court and Tax Court judges have recently
maintained in dissents that an APA analysis is appropriate in at least
16
some deficiency or deficiency-related cases.
Beyond deficiency determinations, there are other types of IRS
adjudications. They include jeopardy- and termination-assessment
11. “[T]he entire [APA] is based upon a dichotomy between rule making and
adjudication.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 14.
12. A later article of mine will examine the requirement as applied to tax regulations
promulgated by the Treasury Department. See, e.g., Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681
F.3d 1313, 1317–19 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (invalidating on APA grounds a regulation as to the
capitalization of interest expenses); Mannella v. Comm’r, 631 F.3d 115, 127–30 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Ambro, J., dissenting) (urging the invalidation of a regulation limiting spousal relief, in part
because of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard).
13. See I.R.C. § 6211–6213 (2012).
14. See infra Part III.A.1.
15. Professor Kenneth Davis once asked rhetorically, “[W]hen the IRS Appellate Division
decides a question against a taxpayer, why is it not required to provide a reasoned opinion,
including systematic findings of fact?” KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 12.13, at 462 (2d ed. 1979); see also Patrick J. Smith, The APA’s ReasonedExplanation Rule and IRS Deficiency Notices, 134 TAX NOTES 331, 331 (2012) (arguing that the
reasoned-explanation requirement should apply to notices of deficiency generally); Lawrence
Zelenak, Should Courts Require the Internal Revenue Service To Be Consistent?, 40 TAX L. REV.
411, 411 (1985) (maintaining that the IRS should have a duty—borrowed from administrative
law—to explain or to repudiate, or lose when it asserts seemingly inconsistent deficiency and
other adjustments).
16. E.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 996–99 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dissenting);
Comm’r v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1278–87 (11th Cir. 2009) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting); Ewing v.
Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 61 (2004) (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., dissenting), rev’d on other grounds,
439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). These cases involved equitable spousal relief under I.R.C.
§ 6015(f).
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determinations, collection due process (CDP) determinations, trust
17
fund recovery determinations, and others. Courts have cited key
reasoned-explanation precedents, such as Securities & Exchange
18
Commission v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), in several cases involving
19
these types of determinations. On many occasions, courts have
invalidated or remanded IRS determinations because of inadequate
explanations, although they have not specified whether they located
20
the explanation duty within or outside of the APA. In addition,
courts have applied APA judicial-review standards that differ from
the reasoned-explanation standard in cases involving IRS
21
adjudication, especially CDP determinations.
Yet the waters are murky. Many cases stand in opposition to the
22
above decisions. In some dimensions of IRS adjudication, little
authority as to explanation exists. Moreover, it is unclear to what
extent the various dimensions of IRS adjudication are comparable.
This Article seeks to advance the understanding of this important yet
understudied area.
The Article has five major parts. Part I describes the reasonedexplanation
requirement,
addressing
its
statutory
bases,
consequences, justifications, costs, and also cases on point. Part II
establishes the proposition—not universally accepted—that the IRS
does in fact adjudicate in an administrative-law sense. It then
develops this idea through four paradigms: deficiency and cognate
determinations, jeopardy and termination determinations, trust fund
recovery “penalty” determinations, and CDP determinations. Part II
concludes by noting that other types of IRS action may also constitute
agency adjudication. Part III demonstrates that substantialexplanation requirements already exist as to most paradigms of IRS

17. See infra Part II.
18. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
19. See, e.g., Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Chenery I, 318
U.S. 80); Salahuddin v. Comm’r, No. 7050-11L, 2012 WL 1758628, at *7 (T.C. May 17, 2012)
(same); cf. Hirschhorn v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 887, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (invoking the
Chenery principle but not citing the case). For a discussion of Chenery, see infra notes 46–62 and
accompanying text.
20. E.g., Walker v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 877, 885 (E.D. Tenn. 1987); Hoyle v.
Comm’r, 131 T.C. 197, 205 (2008); see infra Parts II.B–C.
21. E.g., Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 459–60 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying an abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review); see also Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and Judicial
Review of Tax Collection Decisions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429, 441 (2008) (“[A]dministrative law
and its principles are applicable to most tax collection cases.”).
22. See infra Parts II.B–C.
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adjudication. However, these requirements sound mostly in tax law
rather than in administrative law, and, in their application by the
courts, the requirements sometimes lead to different outcomes than
might be expected under the APA–style arbitrary-and-capricious
analysis.
That being so, the question becomes whether tax-specific
explanation rules should be supplemented by an APA level of
analysis. Parts IV and V address this question. Recognizing the
centrality of context in administrative law, this Article does not
propose a one-size-fits-all solution. Instead, Part IV maintains that
because of a variety of prudential and legal considerations, an APA
explanation requirement should not be grafted onto existing tax
explanation requirements involving deficiency and cognate
determinations.
On similar grounds, Part V reaches the same conclusion as to
IRS jeopardy and termination determinations, trust fund recovery
penalty determinations, and CDP determinations as to liability.
However, these prudential and legal considerations are absent from,
or operate only weakly in, other contexts. Accordingly, Part V offers
that an APA explanation requirement should be applied to CDP
determinations involving collection—as opposed to liability—
determinations. Similarly, although detailed consideration of such
situations is beyond the scope of this Article, in IRS adjudications
outside the above paradigms, the case for applying an APA
explanation requirement is likely to be stronger in collection
situations than in liability situations.
I. THE REASONED-EXPLANATION REQUIREMENT
The reasoned-explanation requirement is part of a much larger
“struggle to devise a successful theory of judicial review of
administrative action.” This problem “is as old as administrative law
23
itself,” and no enduring theory has yet emerged. In fact, “[t]he
courts have not developed a consistent approach to controlling
agency discretion,” and “[l]acking an intelligible theoretical
framework, the Supreme Court has oscillated between activism and
24
restraint in reviewing agency decisions.”

23. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 10, at 440.
24. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1325 (1986); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL
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This difficulty has at least three roots. First, the doctrine reflects
an attempt to balance the important but competing goals of
facilitating government responses to social problems with preserving
the traditions of limited government enshrined in our constitutional
25
order. This balance bobs on the tides of events and rarely remains
stable for long.
Second, in theory, judges are supposed to supervise the
regularity of agency decisions without “imposing on an agency the
reviewing court’s perception of which value choices are legitimate
26
and which are not.” But exercising such discipline can be difficult in
practice. Thus, “the suspicion has arisen . . . that the grand
synthesizing principle that tells us whether the court will dig deeply or
bow cursorily depends . . . on whether the judge agrees with the result
27
of the administrative decision.”
Third, the unsettled constitutional position of agencies further
muddies the waters. “[T]he role and position of the agency, and the
exact locus of its powers, present questions that are delicate, subtle,
and complex. . . . [T]he amorphous character of the administrative
28
agency in the constitutional system escapes simple explanation.” As
conceptions of the constitutional place of agencies change, so do
doctrines of judicial review of administrative action. The eras and
dominating models of American administrative law have been
characterized in several ways. One scholar has traced trends in
judicial review through four successive models: agency expertise (the

SECURITY CLAIMS 1 (1983) (“[T]he history of American administrative law is a history of failed
ideas.”).
25. See, e.g., Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986) (“Our recognition of
Congress’ need to vest administrative agencies with ample power to assist in the difficult task of
governing a vast and complex industrial Nation carries with it the correlative responsibility of
the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its decision . . . .”); Shapiro & Levy,
supra note 10, at 390–96 (arguing that explanation requirements are part of the attempt to
achieve this balance).
26. Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 160 (2012); cf. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983) (“It is not our task to determine what decision we, as Commissioners,
would have reached.”).
27. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision
Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. L. 301, 302 (1981); see Henry
Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969
DUKE L.J. 199, 224; Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness
Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 814 (2008).
28. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 536 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
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dominant model until the 1970s), reasoned decisionmaking (in the
1970s), counteracting interest groups (starting in the 1980s), and
29
presidential control of agencies (currently the dominant model).
Explanation requirements are buffeted by these shifting winds.
Below, the Article discusses the statutory basis of the reasonedexplanation principle, its associated case law, and the principle’s
justifications, costs, and limits.
A. Statutory Bases of the Requirement
30

The APA was enacted in 1946. Some of its sections govern
agencies; others govern judicial review of agency actions. The first
group is not of principal significance to this Article. For example, 5
31
U.S.C. § 553 contains a weak explanation requirement, but that
section applies only to agency rulemaking, not adjudication. Sections
554 through 558 establish a variety of rules, but they apply principally
32
to formal adjudication and rulemaking. IRS adjudications are
33
informal, and so are largely outside these sections.
In contrast, the APA provisions governing judicial review are
pertinent here. These provisions apply “except to the extent
that . . . (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
34
committed to agency discretion by law.” Judicial review under the

29. Seidenfeld, supra note 26, 153–58. But see Shapiro & Levy, supra note 10, 396–412
(describing structuralist, proceduralist, and rationalist models).
30. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)).
31. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (“[T]he agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose.”).
32. As to informal adjudications, the only applicable constraints under these sections are
that the agency must allow the party to be represented, to obtain copies of information she
provides, and to receive a brief statement of the grounds of denial of an application or petition.
Id. § 555.
33. Formal adjudication involves proceedings that are “required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” Id. § 554(a); see United
States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 241 (1973) (holding that the mere use of the word
“hearing” in an enabling act does not trigger formal procedures); cf. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.2, at 381–86 (3d ed. 1994)
(maintaining that the Florida East Coast result should apply to adjudications as well as to
rulemaking). As described in Part III, the statutes governing IRS adjudications do not contain
such language. See, e.g., Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 159, 171 (2001) (Halpern, J., concurring)
(“[A] determination under section 6330(c)(3) is not a formal adjudication.”); Davis v. Comm’r,
115 T.C. 35, 41–42 (2000) (holding that CDP determinations are informal adjudications).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). The second exception is “very narrow . . . [and only] applicable in
those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is
no law to apply.’” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at
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APA is available to persons “suffering legal wrong because of agency
35
action, or adversely affected” by it and reaches “[a]gency action
made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is
36
no other adequate remedy in a court.” However, the APA does not
confer subject-matter jurisdiction. Courts apply APA rules only if
37
other statutes confer upon them jurisdiction to hear a case.
38
Under 5 U.S.C. § 706, and subject to a harmless-error rule,
reviewing courts may “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
39
findings, and conclusions” for any of six reasons. One reason is that
the action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
40
otherwise not in accordance with law.” These terms have not been
given separate meaning. They are understood to provide a single
41
standard, known as the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. This
standard is not limited to formal adjudication or rulemaking. The
statutory text is broader, reaching agency “action, findings, and
conclusions,” and the case law establishes that the standard applies to
42
review of all kinds of agency actions, including adjudications.
Neither the text of § 706 nor its legislative history clarifies the
43
contents of this standard or how stringently it is to be applied. As
26 (1945)). Nonetheless, this exception sometimes has operated in tax cases. For instance, the
IRS has authority to abate liability for interest under some circumstances. I.R.C. § 6404(e).
Before amendment of the statute to provide for judicial review, cases held that interestabatement decisions were committed to the discretion of the IRS, and thus, courts were
precluded by the APA exception from hearing taxpayer challenges to IRS decisions not to abate
interest. E.g., Argabright v. United States, 35 F.3d 472, 473 (9th Cir. 1994).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
36. Id. § 704.
37. E.g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104–07 (1977).
38. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“[D]ue account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”); see
also, e.g., Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406 (2009) (applying a statute with the same
wording as 5 U.S.C. § 706 to require the “Veterans Court to apply the same kind of ‘harmless
error’ rule that courts ordinarily apply in civil cases”). See generally Craig Smith, Note, Taking
“Due Account” of the APA’s Prejudicial-Error Rule, 96 VA. L. REV. 1727 (2010).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
40. Id. § 706(2)(A). The other bases are that the agency action was contrary to
constitutional rights, in excess of the agency’s statutory authority, inconsistent with procedures
required by law, unsupported by substantial evidence (if there is a formal record), or
unwarranted by the facts (if subject to trial de novo). Id. §§ 706(2)(B)–(F).
41. E.g., Matassarin v. Lynch, 174 F.3d 549, 563 (5th Cir. 1999); Salahuddin v. Comm’r, No.
7050-11L, 2012 WL 1758628, at *6 (T.C. May 17, 2012).
42. E.g., Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413–14 (1971); see
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.4, at 1022 (5th ed. 2010);
Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 144 n.15.
43. See Note, Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1909,
1910 (2009).
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shown below, explanation requirements and other aspects of
arbitrary-and-capricious review predated enactment of the APA, and
the stringency of their application by courts has varied over time.
Nonetheless, to the extent that the APA’s reasoned-explanation
requirement applies to IRS adjudication, it applies by virtue of § 706.
B. Judicial Evolution of the Requirement
1. Pre–APA Cases. The roots of the reasoned-explanation
requirement extend back generations before 1946. The earliest cases
involved agency adjudication, not rulemaking. In these cases, courts
instructed agencies to state the reasons and factual findings on which
44
their orders were based. This approach was not followed
45
consistently, however.
The key case of the early period is the Supreme Court’s 1943
46
Chenery decision. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
issued an order prohibiting officers and directors of a public utility
47
holding company from buying stock during reorganization. The SEC
48
based this order on its understanding of fiduciary law. The Court
intimated that the SEC had the authority to issue the order under a
different theory, but that the SEC was wrong in its view of fiduciary
49
law. It invalidated the order and remanded, holding that “an
administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which
the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its
50
action can be sustained.” On remand, the SEC issued the same
order, but based it on the alternative ground suggested by the Court
51
in Chenery I. The Court in Securities & Exchange Commission v.
52
53
Chenery Corp. (Chenery II) upheld the new order. Chenery I is

44. E.g., Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 260 U.S. 48, 58–59 (1922); Am.
Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617, 625–26 (1917).
45. See, e.g., Beaumont, Sour Lake & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 74, 86–87
(1930) (upholding an order despite the agency’s failure to state the facts and reasoning behind
it).
46. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
47. Id. at 81.
48. Id. at 85.
49. Id. at 85–88.
50. Id. at 95. For further discussion of Chenery I, see generally Kevin M. Stack, The
Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L. J. 952 (2007).
51. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947).
52. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
53. Id. at 209.
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understood to mean that the propriety of an agency’s action must be
evaluated on the basis of the reason(s) the agency articulated at the
time, not on the basis of reasons developed later, even if they could
54
have sufficed had they been advanced earlier.
The Chenery cases are often thought to sound in the separation
of powers. The Supreme Court explained that a court “is powerless to
affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be
a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court
into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the
55
administrative agency.”
Instrumental concerns are also at play. A position advanced by
an agency’s lawyer on brief or in argument may not reflect the
agency’s special expertise. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the
persuasive rationale appears for the first time in a legal brief does not
categorically “make it unworthy of deference” if, under the
circumstances at hand, it appears that the interpretation still reflects
“the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in
56
question.” Similarly, post hoc rationales may be unobjectionable in
57
situations in which “no special agency expertise is involved.”
58
The Chenery I principle has been called “well established,”
59
60
“elementary,” and “black-letter law.” Nonetheless, as seen above,
61
there are exceptions. Sometimes the principle is just ignored. Other

54. E.g., Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
55. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196; see also Atlixco Coal. v. Maggiore, 965 P.2d 370, 377 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1998) (reasoning that “is not consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers” for
reviewing courts to supply reasons for administrative actions when the legislature directs an
agency to do so).
56. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997). For further discussion of Auer, see generally
Steve R. Johnson, Auer/Seminole Rock Deference in the Tax Court, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 1
(2013).
57. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 548 F.2d 977, 981 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see Am. Farm
Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
58. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983).
59. Harberson v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 977, 984 (10th Cir. 1987).
60. Hasan v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 545 F.3d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).
61. For example, in one case the EPA changed its justification for a decision while the
litigation was in progress. The Ninth Circuit held the EPA’s reliance on its new interpretation to
be arbitrary and capricious. By five to four, however, the Supreme Court upheld the agency’s
actions. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 649 (2007). But see
id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of ignoring Chenery I’s “hoary principle
of administrative law and substitut[ing] a post-hoc interpretation . . . for that of the relevant
agency”).
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times, the new position is accorded lesser deference rather than being
62
entirely excluded from consideration.
2. Post–APA Cases. Arbitrariness review was highly deferential
63
for several decades after the enactment of the APA. This changed as
New Deal enthusiasm gave way to post–World War II
disenchantment with the performance of agencies and as fears grew
of agencies being captured by the industries they were supposed to
64
regulate. As a result, courts developed a hard-look approach to
arbitrary-and-capricious review. The Supreme Court’s 1971 decision
65
in Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe was significant in this
movement.
At issue in Overton Park was legislation providing that the U.S.
Department of Transportation could expend federal funds on roads
through public parks only if no “feasible and prudent alternative”
existed and only after “all possible planning to minimize harm” to the
66
park. The Department approved such use of federal funds without
67
factual findings as to these predicates.
The lower courts upheld the Department’s decision on the basis
68
of litigation affidavits presented by the Department. The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for the development of a more
69
thorough record. Invoking Chenery I, the Court found the affidavits
70
to be “merely ‘post hoc’ rationalizations” insufficient to allow the
courts to fulfill their duty to ascertain whether the Department had
been faithful to the statutes and whether its decision passed arbitraryand-capricious muster. In a remarkable display of double-talk, the
Court instructed that the scope of review is “narrow,” yet the review
62. E.g., Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 144 (1984); see Richard
Murphy, Chenery Unmasked: Reasonable Limits on the Duty To Give Reasons, 80 U. CIN. L.
REV. 817, 821–22 (2012) (noting how “[c]ourts, confronted by Chenery’s overreach, find ways
around it”).
63. Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 454 (1986); Cass R.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 422 (1987).
64. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1039, 1056 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1555 (1992).
65. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
66. See id. at 405 (quoting Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f)
(Supp. V 1964); Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. V 1964)).
67. Id. at 408.
68. Id. at 409.
69. Id. at 420.
70. Id. at 419.
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71

is to be “searching and careful,” and that the agency “is entitled to a
presumption of regularity,” but the presumption does not shield the
72
agency’s decision “from a thorough, probing, in-depth review.”
The next milestone was the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in
Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
73
Insurance Co. After President Ronald Reagan succeeded President
Jimmy Carter, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
revoked regulations that would have required manufacturers to install
74
either automatic seatbelts or airbags in their cars. The Court
unanimously found that the agency had failed to consider plausible
alternatives, had improperly weighed costs and benefits, and had
“failed to present an adequate basis and explanation for rescinding
the passive restraint requirement,” rendering the decision arbitrary
75
and capricious. In so doing, the Court delivered the most frequently
quoted summary of the elements of arbitrary-and-capricious review.
Specifically,
An agency[’s] [action] would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
76
expertise.

To this partial enumeration may be added two matters that make
the explanation reasoned. The first involves the detail and
specification (or lack thereof) of the agency’s prelitigation
explanation. The Court in State Farm noted that an agency must
“articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action . . . . [It] must
cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given

71. Id. at 416.
72. Id. at 415.
73. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
74. Id. at 36–37.
75. Id. at 34.
76. Id. at 43. It is unclear whether State Farm has meaningfully altered the rate at which
courts invalidate agency decisions. The most recent scholarship suggests that the reversal rate
under State Farm is about the same as reversal rates under most other major standards of review
used in administrative law. Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial
Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 515 (2011). See
generally David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135 (2010).
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77

manner.” As hard-look review evolved, “the courts demanded
increasingly detailed explanations of the agency’s rationale; they
required specification of the agency’s policy premises, its reasoning,
78
and its factual support.” The second involves considering and
responding to comments and possible weaknesses in the agency’s
analysis. Hard-look review is meant “to ensure that agencies disclose
relevant data and provide reasoned responses to material objections
79
raised during the rulemaking process.”
In the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox Television
80
Stations, Inc., the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) held
that a change in agency position imposed no heightened duty of
explanation. Prior to 2009, the FCC made its indecency policy stricter
to reflect its reinterpretation of the constraints of First Amendment
81
case law upon its enforcement power. It then issued notices of
82
apparent liability against a television station for indecent broadcasts.
A sharply divided Supreme Court rejected an arbitrary-and83
capricious challenge to the new policy. The Fox majority first
rehearsed general principles. It noted that the arbitrary-andcapricious standard was “narrow,” that a court should not substitute
its policy judgment for that of the agency, and that an agency
explanation “of less than ideal clarity” should nonetheless be upheld
84
“if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” The majority
then held that there was “no basis” in either the APA or State Farm
“for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more
85
searching review.” Further, the majority held:
[T]he requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for
its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is
changing position. . . . And of course the agency must show that
there are good reasons for the new policy. But it need not [always]
demonstrate . . . that the reasons for the new policy are better than

77. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 48–49.
78. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 526
(1985).
79. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58
DUKE L.J. 2125, 2181 (2009); see Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 155.
80. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
81. Id. at 507–08.
82. Id. at 510.
83. Id. at 530.
84. Id. at 513–14.
85. Id. at 514.
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for the old one . . . . Sometimes it must—when, for
new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict
underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has
serious reliance interests that must be taken into

In short, the leading cases teach us that there is a reasonedexplanation requirement. That requirement applies to all agencies
and to all final agency actions (adjudication as well as rulemaking).
However, there is no formula for how much explanation is enough.
The sufficiency of the explanation depends on the circumstances.
C. Remedying Violations of the Reasoned-Explanation Requirement
When an agency fails to satisfy the reasoned-explanation
87
requirement, the usual consequence is remand to the agency. What
happens then depends upon the nature and complexity of the matter.
Professors Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy have outlined three
possible scenarios:
First, there may be an easily remedied flaw in the agency’s logic or
gap in its reasoning process. In such a case, the agency on remand
need not engage in any additional procedures to correct this flaw.
Second, an agency may be required to provide additional factual
support for its decision, which might lead to additional proceedings
pursuant to the APA. Finally, in rare cases the agency may be
unable to elicit adequate support for its reasoning without engaging
88
in some form of hybrid procedures.

When regulations are concerned, remand usually delays, rather
than prevents, the action the agency wants to take. One study found
that agencies “successfully implemented their policies in
approximately 80% of the instances in which courts have originally
remanded rules as arbitrary and capricious,” and that the average

86. Id. at 515 (citing Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)). Justice
Kennedy concluded that the reasons given by the FCC “[were] not so precise, detailed, or
elaborated as to be a model for agency explanation” but sufficed. Id. at 538 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Four dissenting Justices would have
imposed a higher burden of explanation when agencies change positions and would have
invalidated the new policy because the FCC failed “at least minimally” to consider two allegedly
important issues. Id. at 546, 553 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87. E.g., Air Transp. Ass’n of Can. v. FAA, 254 F.3d 271, 279 (D.C. Cir. 2001), vacated, 276
F.3d 599 (D.C. Cir. 2001); AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 236 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
88. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 10, at 435 (footnotes omitted).
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delay between remand and recovery was about two years. The
extent to which remand can and should be used in the context of tax
regulations has not been tested in the courts and is in dispute among
90
commentators.
The effects outside of the rulemaking context have not been
studied systematically. Chenery I did not significantly impair the
91
SEC’s ability to impose its orders. However, Overton Park—which
92
invoked the now disfavored approach of remand to the trial court,
93
not the agency —caused the Department of Transportation to
94
abandon its decision to fund the project.
D. Justifications for the Requirement
“The practice of providing reasons for decisions has long been
95
considered an essential aspect of legal culture.” Numerous
justifications have been adduced for the reasoned-explanation
requirement and for the larger arbitrary-and-capricious review of
which it is a part. The justifications fall into three main categories:
constitutional considerations, political-process considerations, and
decisional-quality considerations. Some of the justifications apply
with different force in the rulemaking versus the adjudication context.
Nonetheless, all are worth noting for their contribution to the
development of the doctrine.
89. William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 440 (2000).
90. Compare Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
126 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1753–54 (2013) (suggesting that remand without vacatur can be used
to avoid disruption when tax regulations are invalidated on APA grounds), with Patrick J.
Smith, May Regulations that Violate the APA Be Remanded to the IRS?, 141 TAX NOTES 84, 85
(2013) (arguing that remand without vacatur is unavailable as to tax regulations because of the
Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421).
91. See supra notes 46–55 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Camp. v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 139–40 (1973) (per curiam).
93. See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (remanding
the case to the district court for “plenary review of the Secretary’s decision,” including, if
necessary, taking the testimony of the administrative officials who participated in the decision).
94. See Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations
and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal
Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 723 n.18 (1975).
95. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 633 (1995). And not just
American legal culture. For a discussion of cognate principles in Europe, see generally Jerry L.
Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project of
Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99 (2007); and Martin Shapiro, The Giving
Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179 (1992).
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1. Constitutional Considerations.
Many commentators and
judges root the reasoned-explanation requirement in the separation96
of-powers principle. Some view the requirement as a necessary
condition for judicial review, allowing the courts to fulfill their Article
97
III duties. The requirement might also be thought of as a way to
prevent courts from exceeding their constitutional role. Giving
reasons helps to separate value judgments (which administrators can
legitimately make but judges cannot) from objective analysis (which
98
judges can legitimately review). And, of course, requiring reasons
also helps keep agencies from exceeding their constitutional roles, as
“arbitrariness review can be seen as a substitute for the failed
nondelegation doctrine, the former limiting agencies’ discretion in
99
light of the latter’s inability to do the same.”
2. Political-Process Considerations. By compelling agencies to
give reasons and respond to objections, the reasoned-explanation
requirement makes them disclose the relevant data, the values and
100
assumptions in play, and the trade-offs entailed in the choice. This is
101
thought to protect citizen participation in government, foster
102
103
informed political dialogue, facilitate political accountability,
104
express the respect that government owes to its citizens, and put
“less connected interest groups on the same footing . . . as more
105
focused groups like the regulated industry.” In addition, judicial

96. E.g., Shapiro & Levy, supra note 10, at 388; Stack, supra note 50, at 956–58.
97. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
98. E.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 541–42 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Orum v. Comm’r, 412 F.3d 819, 821 (7th Cir. 2005);
see Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 148.
99. Note, supra note 43, at 1912. See generally Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False
Promise of the New Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2000).
100. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 79, at 2181.
101. Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal
Regulatory Efforts To Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 768.
102. Colin Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393,
414 (1981).
103. Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 148. See generally Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and
Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253 (2009).
104. Cf. Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public
Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 9 (1999) (offering this
justification in support of a contention that legislatures have an obligation to explain the laws
they enact).
105. Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 157.

JOHNSON FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

REASONED EXPLANATION

4/21/2014 9:15 AM

1789

review provides “a crucial legitimating function in the modern
106
administrative process.”
3. Decisional-Quality Considerations. In theory, a reasoned
explanation might improve the quality of agency decisionmaking. The
107
doctrine might cause agencies to rethink close calls. And, it may
serve a useful signaling function, identifying the need for additional
scrutiny of agency positions that either received inadequate
108
deliberation, or reflected political payoffs or agency capture rather
109
than good public policy. Are such theories borne out in fact?
110
Commentators disagree.
E. Objections to the Requirement
Two principal objections have been lodged against explanation
requirements, and against arbitrary-and-capricious review more
generally. Specifically, they are thought to contribute to outcomedriven judicial decisionmaking and regulatory ossification. These
concerns are described below.
1. Outcome-Driven Decisionmaking. As noted above, one
claimed advantage of hard-look review is that it allows courts to
ensure that agencies did their job seriously but leaves policy decisions
to the agencies. That is nice in theory and, no doubt, is realized in
some instances. But a darker potential also exists.
106. Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of Administrative
Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599, 642 (1997); see also LOUIS L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965) (“The availability of judicial
review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative
power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”).
107. E.g., Friendly, supra note 27, at 207–08.
108. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review,
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 755 (2006).
109. E.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals To
Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 510 (1997);
Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 154, 178.
110. Compare Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239,
239 (1973) (“I know of no solid evidence to support the belief that requiring articulation,
detailed findings or reasoned opinions enhances the integrity or propriety of the administrative
decisions.”), with Friendly, supra note 27, at 207–08 (concluding that remands for better
explanation have significantly improved agency decisionmaking), and Mark Seidenfeld,
Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL
L. REV. 486, 543–48 (2002) (noting that “assessing the impact of judicial review on these
processes requires some speculation,” but providing reasons to think that it improves agency
decisionmaking).
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A judge would be rightly taken to task for writing an opinion
that forthrightly says “I am reversing because, by my constellation of
values, the agency’s chosen outcome was unwise, unjust, and just
plain dumb.” It is far safer for the judge to accomplish a substantive
outcome through procedural means. For example, an opinion that
disingenuously says “I say nothing about the substance of the
agency’s end result; it is just that the agency used the wrong process in
reaching that result,” is far more likely to be palatable.
Justice Black gave voice to this concern in his Chenery I
111
112
dissent, as have scholars. One may be forgiven for suspecting that
such policymaking by indirection was at work in Overton Park, and
113
quite probably in other cases as well. Scholars have studied the
correlation of judges’ political affiliation and ideological orientation
114
with their pro- or anti-agency holdings. In the context of review of
IRS adjudications, such factors presumably would operate rarely. But
another kind of subterfuge effect—sympathy for individual
taxpayers—might rear its head.
2. Ossification. Ossification is a much-masticated morsel in
administrative law. The notion is that, when courts make agencies
jump through procedural hoops, the extent and quality of agencies’
115
regulatory efforts may suffer. Yet ossification is not always bad.
Inhibiting unwise agency actions would be no loss. Ossification can be
116
seen as “the price society pays for reducing agencies’ error[]” costs.

111. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 99 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting)
(“Hypercritical exactions as to findings can provide a handy but an almost invisible glideway
enabling courts to pass ‘from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of
policy.’” (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941))).
112. E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in
Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 504–07 (1985).
113. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls
over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992).
114. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1746
(1999); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure Out
About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 24–26 & n.80 (2009).
115. E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L.
REV. 59, 62–66 (1995); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political
Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988
DUKE L.J. 300, 310. But see Jordan, supra note 89, at 403–07 (questioning the ossification
theory).
116. Note, supra note 43, at 1910; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 189 (“At the
administrative level, hard-look review plays somewhat the same role that bicameralism and
presentment are meant to play at the legislative level.”).
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Ossification is discussed far more often in the context of
117
rulemaking than in the context of adjudication. However, somewhat
comparable costs could arise as to IRS adjudication. This possibility is
118
explored in Part IV.A below.
F. Limits of the Requirement
Reflecting the attempt to balance the benefits and costs
described above, courts have developed a number of limitations on
the required extent of explanation. Unsurprisingly, courts differ as to
how they draw the contours of these limitations. The following are
among the principal limitations. First, courts “will uphold a decision
of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be
119
discerned.” Accordingly, despite Chenery I, courts may accept post
hoc explanations that “merely illuminate reasons obscured but
120
implicit in the administrative record.” Similarly, explanation is
121
unnecessary when the reason for the agency’s action is obvious. It is,
after all, a hoary maxim that the law does not command performance
122
of meaningless acts.
Second, the agency’s consideration of alternatives is not deficient
“simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device
123
and thought conceivable by the mind of man.” Generally, the

117. In tax, for example, fears have been expressed that greater attention to the APA’s
rulemaking requirements would inhibit the ability of Treasury to issue guidance needed by
taxpayers. I doubt it. See generally Steve R. Johnson, Following the APA Will Not Eliminate
Useful Guidance, 130 TAX NOTES 128 (2011).
118. See infra Part IV.A.
119. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974);
Casino Airlines, Inc. v. NTSB, 439 F.3d 715, 717 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Bowman, 419 U.S. at
286); see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973) (per curiam) (“The [agency’s] explanation
may have been curt, but it surely indicated the determinative reason for the final action
taken . . . .”).
120. Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 83 F.3d 1497, 1507
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Clifford v. Pena, 77 F.3d 1414, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
121. See, e.g., Michael Asimov, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California
Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1238 (1995); cf. Sheppard v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d
756, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding harmless an agency’s failure to undertake formal notice and
comment because the agency’s substantive approach was “the only reasonable one”).
122. E.g., Lessinger v. Comm’r, 872 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1989).
123. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
551 (1978); see, e.g., Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 42 F.3d 517, 524–25 (9th Cir.
1994); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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agency needs to respond only to comments it has received, and even
124
then only to relevant, significant, and viable comments.
Third, explanation and support may not be demanded beyond
the bounds of reason and feasibility. For example, “[t]here are some
propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be
marshaled . . . . It is one thing to set aside agency action under the
[APA] because of failure to adduce empirical data that can readily be
obtained. . . . It is something else to insist upon obtaining the
125
unobtainable.”
Fourth, a technical breach will be excused if the complaining
party suffered no detriment. In such cases, the harmless-error rule
126
applies. For example, “[w]hen it is clear that based on the valid
findings the agency would have reached the same ultimate result, [a
court will] not improperly invade the administrative province by
127
affirming.”
II. IRS ADJUDICATION
When one thinks of administrative adjudication, images of
hearings before administrative-law judges (ALJ) or agency
commissioners may come to mind. Such proceedings do not typify
128
but there are other kinds of agency
federal tax practice,
adjudication.
Tax professionals are not accustomed to thinking of the IRS as
an adjudicatory body, but the IRS does engage in what constitutes
adjudication in an administrative-law sense. The APA defines
“adjudication” as an “agency process for the formulation of an

124. E.g., Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n of Am. v. FERC, 494 F.3d 1092, 1096 (D.C. Cir.
2007); City of Brookings Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 1153, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Career
Coll. Ass’n v. Duncan, 796 F. Supp. 2d 108, 123 (D.D.C. 2011).
125. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009).
126. E.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 659 (2007);
PDK Labs., Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Greater Bos. Television Corp. v.
FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
127. Salt River Project Ag. Improvement & Power Dist. v. United States, 762 F.2d 1053,
1060–61 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Consol. Coal Co. v. Smith, 837 F.2d 321, 323 (8th Cir.
1988); cf. Bank of Am., N.A. v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that
Chenery I’s prohibition on post hoc rationales does not apply to agency arguments offered
under step one of Chevron analysis).
128. There are rare exceptions to this statement. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.1–10.9, 10.20–10.38
(2013) (setting out hearing procedures for tax professionals subject to discipline for violation of
rules of ethical practice before the IRS).
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129

order,” and it defines “order” as “the whole or a part of a final
disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory
in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including
130
licensing.”
As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency
action to be “final”: First, the action must mark the “consummation”
of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be of merely
tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be
one by which “rights or obligations have been determined,” or from
131
which “legal consequences will flow.”

Under these definitions, many determinations made by the IRS
can rightly be called adjudications. For reasons of manageability and
principle, this Article focuses on four paradigm determinations—
deficiency, jeopardy and termination, trust fund recovery penalty, and
CDP determinations—then briefly adverts to other types of IRS
determinations. This Part develops these four paradigms of IRS
adjudication. The next Part addresses whether—as a matter of
current law and practice—the IRS explains its adjudicatory decisions
in the context of these paradigms.
A. Deficiency Determinations
At one time, there was no prepayment remedy available to
taxpayers contesting federal tax liabilities. Taxpayers had to pay the
determined liabilities, then bring suit for refund of taxes illegally
assessed and collected. After enactment of the modern federal
132
income tax in 1913, however, pressure to create a prepayment
forum became irresistible. The forum evolved from a unit within the
then-styled Internal Revenue Bureau itself, to an independent
administrative agency known as the Board of Tax Appeals, to the Tax

129. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2012).
130. Id. § 551(6). Professor Alan Morrison, by reading a number of provisions in concert,
concludes that “[u]nder the APA, any agency action that is not a rulemaking is an
adjudication.” Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and
Courts—Except When They’re Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 98 (2007).
131. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948); Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v.
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
132. Underwood Tariff Act, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
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Court of the United States (still an administrative agency), and finally
133
to the current United States Tax Court (an Article I court).
The IRS lacks legal authority to assess and collect certain major
taxes—income, estate, gift, and some excise taxes—until the taxpayer
134
has had the opportunity to contest the liabilities in Tax Court. In
brief, the process is as follows: First, the taxpayer files a return.
Second, the IRS selects the return for examination. Third, if the IRS
agent believes that correct liability exceeds liability reported on the
return (that is, that a deficiency exists), the agent issues to the
taxpayer a preliminary document (the Revenue Agent’s Report or
thirty-day letter) setting out proposed adjustments. Fourth, if the
taxpayer disagrees, she can obtain administrative review by filing a
protest with the IRS Appeals Office. Fifth, if Appeals Office
consideration is not requested or no resolution is reached at Appeals,
the IRS issues a notice of deficiency (also called a ninety-day letter).
Sixth, the taxpayer may contest the determinations in the notice of
deficiency by filing a timely petition with the Tax Court. Seventh, if
the taxpayer fails to file a timely petition or if the Tax Court holds
against the taxpayer in whole or part, the IRS may then assess and
135
collect the deficiency (and interest and penalties, if any).
The notice of deficiency represents the IRS’s final
136
137
determination. It is the taxpayer’s “ticket to the Tax Court.” The
taxpayer may not invoke the Tax Court’s jurisdiction until the notice
138
of deficiency has been issued. The IRS Chief Counsel’s Office must
review and approve certain notices of deficiency, including those from
cases involving substantial deficiencies, certain penalties, complex or
139
unique legal issues, or otherwise sensitive matters.
133. The history is developed by HAROLD DUBROFF, THE TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS (1979), Steve R. Johnson, Reforming Federal Tax Litigation: An Agenda, 41 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243632, and Leandra
Lederman, (Un)Appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835 (2014).
134. I.R.C. § 6212(a) (2012). Statutory exceptions exist. For example, the IRS can
immediately assess amounts reported on the taxpayer’s return and underpayments attributable
to math errors on the return. Id. §§ 6201(a), (b)(1).
135. See id. §§ 6211–6215. For greater detail, see generally DAVID M. RICHARDSON,
JEROME BORISON & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 93–133, 207–33 (2d ed. 2008).
136. I.R.C. § 6212(a). The taxpayer may seek reconsideration of the determinations in the
notice, and the IRS has authority to compromise its determinations and even to rescind the
notice. I.R.C. §§ 6212(d), 7122(a). However, agency action is final even when reconsideration is
possible. 5 U.S.C. § 704; Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 145 (1993).
137. Comm’r v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 630 n.12 (1976).
138. I.R.C. § 6213(a).
139. IRM 4.8.9.9.2.1 (July 9, 2013).
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Income-tax liabilities arising from the operation of some
140
partnerships are handled under a special regime. That regime
establishes cognate rules to the deficiency procedures, requiring
issuance of a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA)
141
resembling a notice of deficiency. The determinations in an FPAA
may be challenged in court on a preassessment basis roughly
142
comparable to Tax Court consideration of a notice of deficiency.
Cognate procedures also exist as to transferee and fiduciary
liabilities, which are secondary collection mechanisms available as to
143
income, estate, gift, and some excise taxes. Such liabilities are
required to “be assessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and
subject to the same provisions and limitations” as the taxes to which
144
they relate. Thus, when a notice of deficiency (followed by the
opportunity for prepayment judicial consideration) would have been
required before assessment of the underlying tax, a notice of
transferee (or fiduciary) liability (followed by the opportunity for
prepayment judicial consideration) is required before assessment of
the secondary liability for the unpaid amount.
B. Jeopardy and Termination Determinations
The operation of the deficiency procedures takes years.
Normally, lack of celerity is tolerable because the IRS eventually
145
collects and interest accrues throughout the period. But the delay
tempts some taxpayers to hide, transfer, or dissipate their assets in
anticipation of ultimately losing in Tax Court, rendering the IRS’s
victory fiscally hollow. To protect the fisc when such contingencies
materialize, the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) allows the IRS to
shortcut the normal deficiency procedures by making immediate
termination and jeopardy assessments followed by immediate
146
collection of determined liabilities.

140. I.R.C. §§ 6221–6255. See generally RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 135, at 161–78.
141. I.R.C. § 6223(a)(2).
142. Id. § 6226.
143. See Steve R. Johnson, Unfinished Business on the Taxpayer Rights Agenda: Achieving
Fairness in Transferee Liability Cases, 19 VA. TAX. REV. 403, 406–07 (2000).
144. I.R.C. § 6901(a).
145. See id. §§ 6601, 6621.
146. Termination assessments are of income taxes for not-yet-ended tax years. I.R.C. § 6851.
Jeopardy assessments are of income, estate, gift, and certain excise taxes for tax periods already
completed. Id. § 6861; see RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 135, at 184.
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Mindful of due process implications, and to prevent the IRS from
147
overreaching in using these powerful devices, Congress enacted
148
I.R.C. § 7429. It requires, in addition to other internal approvals,
that the IRS Chief Counsel’s Office approve the expedited
149
assessment or levy. Then, the IRS must, within five days, send the
taxpayer “a written statement of the information upon which [it]
150
relied in making [the] assessment or levy.”
Thereafter, the taxpayer may, within thirty days, seek review by
the IRS Appeals Office, which is required to determine the
151
reasonableness of the making and amount of the assessment or levy.
If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with that determination, she may bring
152
an action, usually in federal district court, to dispute it. Within
twenty days, the district court must decide whether the making of the
assessment or levy and the amount thereof were “reasonable under
153
the circumstances.” This decision is “final and conclusive and shall
154
not be reviewed by any other court.” This proceeding does not
resolve the underlying merits. The idea is to freeze the situation to
prevent erosion of collection protection but not to determine with
finality the correct amount of liability. The IRS still must issue a
155
notice of deficiency, giving the taxpayer the opportunity for a
review by the Tax Court to determine the merits.

147. See, e.g., Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 185–88 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Breen v. United States, No. C81-517a, 1981 WL 1936, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 1981).
148. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1204, 90 Stat. 1520, 1695 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 7429).
149. I.R.C. § 7429(a)(1)(A).
150. Id. § 7429(a)(1)(B).
151. Id. §§ 7429(a)(2)–(3).
152. Id. §§ 7429(b)(1)–(2).
153. Id. §§ 7429(b)(3)–(4). This standard is fairly deferential to the IRS. It requires
something more than “not arbitrary and capricious” but something less than “substantial
evidence.” E.g., Harvey v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1097, 1104 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
154. I.R.C. § 7429(f). Despite this language, some circuits have held that § 7429 decisions are
appealable for limited purposes, such as whether the trial court exceeded its authority,
improperly evaluated standing, or committed procedural errors. E.g., Morgan v. United States,
958 F.2d 950, 951–52 (9th Cir. 1992).
155. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6851(b) (termination assessments); id. § 6861(b) (jeopardy
assessments).
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C. CDP Determinations
156

Legislation passed in 1998 made over sixty IRS “reforms.”
Some of these changes were harmful, many were purely cosmetic, and
157
a few were beneficial. The most significant of the 1998 changes was
the introduction of CDP rules in I.R.C. §§ 6320 and 6330. The IRS
has long possessed collection weapons more powerful than those
158
available to private creditors. The introduction of CDP rules
reflected Congress’s concern that the IRS sometimes wielded these
weapons too aggressively and with insufficient sensitivity to their
159
effects on the delinquent taxpayers.
With stated exceptions, the CDP rules kick in when the IRS files
160
notice of its tax lien or before the IRS levies on property. They
require the IRS to notify the taxpayer of the action, explaining “in
simple and nontechnical terms” the amount of unpaid tax, the
taxpayer’s right to a hearing and administrative appeal, and the rules
161
governing actions the IRS intends to take.
Within thirty days, the taxpayer may request a hearing with the
162
Appeals Office. At the hearing, the Appeals Officer must obtain
verification that the IRS has followed required procedures and must
consider nonfrivolous arguments raised by the taxpayer, including
156. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 23, 26, and 38 U.S.C.). This episode
in the “sausage factory” is chronicled in Steve. R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic
Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413,
446–57 (1999), and commented upon by Bryan T. Camp, Theory and Practice in Tax
Administration, 29 VA. TAX REV. 227, 271 (2009).
157. For a description of the changes, see generally Robert Manning & David F. Windish,
The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act: An Explanation, 80 TAX NOTES 83 (1998).
158. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The IRS as Super Creditor, 92 TAX NOTES 655, 655–56
(2001).
159. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 44, 67 (1998); see Leandra Lederman & Stephen W. Mazza,
Addressing Imperfections in the Tax System: Procedural or Substantive Reform?, 103 MICH L.
REV. 1423, 1441 (2005).
The CDP regime is controversial. Some urge its outright repeal; some suggest
modifications; and some defend its necessity. See, e.g., 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 226–45, 451–70, 498–510
(2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/ntafy2004annualreport.pdf; Cords, supra note 21,
at 444 & n.91; Steve R. Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Compliance and
Tax Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1031, 1061 (2003). See generally Book, supra note 7;
Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 84 IND. L. J. 57
(2009).
160. I.R.C. §§ 6320(a), 6330(a).
161. Id. §§ 6320(a)(3), 6330(a)(3).
162. Id. §§ 6320(a)(3)(B), 6330(a).
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spousal defenses, the appropriateness of collection actions, collection
alternatives, and (when the taxpayer did not have previous
opportunity to dispute them) the existence and amount of the
163
underlying liability. The Appeals Officer’s decision is set out in a
164
notice of determination. Within thirty days thereafter, the taxpayer
165
may appeal the decision to the Tax Court.
In general, the IRS is precluded from taking forced collection
166
action during administrative and judicial review. As a consequence,
the normal statute of limitations on IRS collection activity is
167
suspended during this period. A taxpayer who fails to timely invoke
the CDP process may request an “equivalent hearing” at the Appeals
Office, but collection is not suspended and judicial review is not
168
available.
D. Trust Fund Recovery Penalty Determinations
Employers deduct from their employees’ paychecks withholding
on federal income tax and the employees’ share of Federal Insurance
Contributions Act taxes. Employers are supposed to pay these
amounts (called trust fund taxes) over to the IRS at specified
169
intervals. When employers experiencing financial difficulties fail to
make these remittances, trying to collect from the employers would
be futile. Thus, Congress gave the IRS a secondary collection
mechanism: I.R.C. § 6672 allows the IRS to assert personal liability
against “responsible persons,” that is, the principal officers and
owners of the employer who decided not to pay the trust fund taxes
170
to the IRS.

163. Id. §§ 6320(c), 6330(c), (g).
164. For an example of a notice of determination, see Davis v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 35, 38
(2000).
165. I.R.C. §§ 6320(c), 6330(d)(1).
166. Id. § 6330(a)(1). Exceptions are set out in § 6330(f). See, e.g., Burke v. Comm’r, 124
T.C. 189, 196 (2005).
167. I.R.C. §§ 6320(e)(1), 6330(e)(1); see id. §§ 6502, 6503 (setting out the collection statuteof-limitation rules).
168. See, e.g., Herrick v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467, 1469 (2003).
169. I.R.C. §§ 3121(a), 3402.
170. See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 135, at 384. This device is popularly known as the
“trust fund recovery penalty,” the “responsible person penalty,” or the “100 percent penalty.”
Actually, it is a collection device, not a penalty. The IRS is not permitted to collect and retain
amounts in excess of the unpaid trust fund taxes. E.g., Allan v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 499,
501 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff’d, 514 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Before assessing § 6672 liabilities, the IRS is required to send the
responsible person a sixty-day letter, specifying how much liability it
171
has determined for each tax period. This gives the responsible
person the opportunity to file a protest, triggering Appeals Office
consideration. If the protest is timely filed, the IRS may not assess the
liabilities until after the Appeals Office renders its final
172
determination. If no protest is filed or the case is not resolved at
Appeals, the IRS assesses the liability. Postpayment judicial review is
173
available in district court or the Court of Federal Claims.
E. Other IRS Determinations
The four paradigms just limned constitute agency adjudication as
understood by administrative law. Each is required by statute. Each is
consequential in the sense that its application is a prerequisite to the
174
IRS’s assessment or collection of taxes. Each prescribes a particular
type of written decision by the IRS. And each represents the IRS’s
final decision after review of the preliminary conclusions of the line
175
agent handling the case.
Other types of IRS determinations possess some of these
attributes and arguably rise to the level of adjudication. For example,
Professor Bryan Camp maintains that the IRS makes an adjudication
decision every time it assesses liabilities reported on income-tax
176
returns or refund overpayments claimed on such returns. Moreover,
I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) provides generally that both spouses are
177
responsible for liabilities as to their joint income-tax returns. To
mitigate potentially harsh consequences, § 6015 relieves spouses of

171. I.R.C. §§ 6672(b)(1)–(2).
172. Except in jeopardy situations. The running of the statute of limitations on collection is
suspended during the protest and administrative appeals process. Id. §§ 6672(b), (c).
173. Id. § 6672(c)(1). The Tax Court also can hear § 6672 issues if the CDP process is
invoked.
174. In addition, such determinations sometimes have significant collateral consequences.
For example, liabilities determined in a notice of deficiency, even though not confirmed through
litigation, can be treated as binding in computing a convict’s eligibility for parole. Kramer v.
Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 901–02 (7th Cir. 1986), reh’g granted, 806 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1986).
175. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6)–(7) (defining adjudication as the process for formulating the
agency’s “final disposition”); see also Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 159, 170 (2001) (Halpern, J.,
concurring) (stating that an IRS CDP determination “is, within the meaning of the APA, an
‘adjudication’”).
176. Bryan T. Camp, ‘Loving’ Return Preparer Regulation, 140 TAX NOTES 457, 463–66
(2013).
177. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3).
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178

This Article does not
liability in particular circumstances.
treat § 6015 cases as a separate paradigm because, although “standalone” cases are possible, spousal relief controversies usually play out
in either the deficiency or CDP contexts. Nonetheless, there is a
sizable body of instructive case law under § 6015, on which this
179
Article will later draw. Similarly, if the deficiency procedures do not
apply in a particular situation, or they would apply but the taxpayer
chooses not to invoke them, the taxpayer can still obtain postpayment
review by fully paying the additional tax determined by the IRS,
timely filing a refund claim with the IRS, and, after the IRS denies or
ignores the refund claim, timely filing a refund suit in federal district
180
court or the Court of Federal Claims.
The IRS denies a refund claim by issuing to the taxpayer a notice
181
of disallowance. This Article does not include such determinations
among its paradigms because they are less consequential than a
deficiency notice. A deficiency notice is a legal prerequisite to Tax
Court litigation and to assessment and collection. In a refund claim
situation, however, the IRS has already made the assessment and has
the money. Moreover, the disallowance notice is not a prerequisite to
refund litigation. Even if the IRS issues no such notice, the taxpayer
may sue after six months have elapsed from the filing of the refund
182
claim. Despite these differences, however, some might see a refund
claim disallowance determination as an IRS adjudication.
183
Other IRS determinations arguably also may be adjudications.
It would exhaust both author and reader to plumb the depths of all
possible examples. However, Part V below offers some preliminary
thoughts as to how APA–style explanation arguments might be
handled in these other contexts.

178. Id. § 6015.
179. See infra Part III.A.3.
180. See I.R.C. §§ 6511, 6532, 7522; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).
181. See IRM 34.5.2.2 (Dec. 21, 2012).
182. I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1).
183. For example, I.R.C. § 7428(a)(1) provides for judicial consideration of IRS
“determination[s]” relating to the tax status of various organizations. Section 7436(a) authorizes
judicial consideration of IRS “determination[s]” as to the employment status of workers.
And § 6404(b) involves IRS decisions to not abate liability for interest.
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III. CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE OF IRS EXPLANATIONS
This Part considers two matters. The first and longer issue looks
at whether and to what extent current law requires the IRS to provide
explanations of its adjudicatory decisions. Does the IRS now have
duties of explanation? If so, how extensive are they and what legal
rules authorize the imposition of these duties? The second matter
involves current practice. Whether under the goad of legal
compulsion or simply as a matter of administrative practice, does the
IRS give explanations of its adjudicatory determinations? If so, how
adequate are they?
A. The Law Governing IRS Explanations
Currently, there is not a single rule as to required explanations
that cuts across and operates with uniformity in all areas of IRS
adjudication. Instead, there are multiple sources of duties of
explanation. Judges and commentators have anchored perceived
duties of explanation variously in tax law, the APA, or administrative
common law. Often they have just asserted the existence of a duty but
have not moored it in any particular law. Moreover, the relevant case
law is thin. Some significant questions have never been settled, while
some seemingly settled principles have recently been questioned as
being outmoded. This Part wades into these murky waters. It orients
the discussion around the four paradigms of IRS adjudication
developed in Part II.
1. Deficiency Determinations. As described in Section II.A
above, in some instances the IRS may not assess tax liabilities until
the deficiency procedures have run their course. Central to these
procedures is the issuance of a notice of deficiency. According to
Professor Leandra Lederman, a notice of deficiency “plays three
conceptually distinct roles in tax litigation. First, it is . . . the
jurisdictional ‘ticket to Tax Court.’ Second, it notifies the taxpayer of
the IRS’s determination, comparable to legal process. Third, it also
184
functions as a pleading in ensuing Tax Court litigation.”
But deficiency notices traditionally have been conceptualized
more narrowly. Many judges and scholars have emphasized the first
of the above functions, seeing a notice of deficiency as “nothing more

184. Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to
Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 203 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
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than ‘a jurisdictional prerequisite to a taxpayer’s suit seeking the Tax
Court’s redetermination of [the IRS’s] determination of the tax
185
liability.’”
Perhaps reflecting that narrow view—as well as the fact that
I.R.C. § 6212 prescribes no particular contents for a deficiency
186
notice —there is a long line of cases (starting in the 1930s) holding
that a valid notice can have only minimal content and need not take a
187
particular form. Under this line of cases, a notice is valid as long as
it specifies the deficiency and identifies the tax period to which it
188
relates, even if it contains no explanation of the basis on which the
189
IRS determined the deficiency.
Moreover, courts typically hold that they will not “go behind”
the notice to examine the mindset of the IRS or the procedures it
190
used in the particular case. However, I.R.C. § 6212(a) does require
191
that the IRS “determine[]” the deficiency.
Thus, it “clearly
contemplates” that the IRS must make “a thoughtful and considered
192
determination.” This has given rise to limited taxpayer protective
rules. For example, if it is clear from the face of the notice that the
IRS did not make a considered determination as to the particular
193
taxpayer, the notice is invalid.
Alternatively, if the IRS’s
determination is utterly without factual foundation, it is arbitrary and

185. Scar v. Comm’r, 814 F.2d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987) (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Stamm Int’l Corp. v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 248, 252 (1985)).
186. E.g., United States v. Lehigh, 201 F. Supp. 224, 232 (W.D. Ark. 1961).
187. E.g., Comm’r v. Forest Glen Creamery Co., 98 F.2d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 1938); see, e.g.,
Olsen v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1937) (“[T]he notice is only to advise the person
who is to pay the deficiency that the [IRS] means to assess him; anything that does this
unequivocally is good enough.”).
188. E.g., Foster v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 34, 229–30 (1983), aff’d in part, 756 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir.
1985); Jarvis v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 646, 655–56 (1982).
189. E.g., Abrams v. Comm’r, 787 F.2d 939, 941 (4th Cir. 1986); Abatti v. Comm’r, 644 F.2d
1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1981); Barnes v. Comm’r, 408 F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir. 1969); Comm’r v.
Stewart, 186 F.2d 239, 242 (6th Cir. 1951).
190. E.g., Estate of Brimm v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 15, 23 (1978); Greenberg’s Express, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 62 T.C. 324, 327 (1974).
191. I.R.C. § 6212(a) (2012).
192. Couzens v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 1040, 1159 (1928); see also In re Terminal Wine Co., 1
B.T.A. 697, 701 (1925) (“By its very definition and etymology the word ‘determination’
irresistibly connotes consideration, resolution, conclusion, and judgment.”).
193. The key case is Scar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987). In Scar, the
notice disallowed deductions from a tax shelter the taxpayers had not participated in and from
which their return claimed no deductions. Id. at 1365. The IRS conceded that the notice was
erroneous. Id. The court emphasized, however, that application of this principle would be rare.
Id. at 1367 n.6.
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194

capricious. This strips the notice of the presumption of regularity to
which the IRS normally is entitled and shifts the burden of proof to
195
the IRS.
Even under the strikingly indulgent principles above, deficiency
notices sometimes were invalidated because they were inadequately
explained. On those rare occasions, however, the basis of the
explanation duty was seen as a matter of federal tax law—that is, as a
construction of the term “determine[]” in I.R.C. § 6212(a)—rather
than as a construction of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), or any other feature of
196
general administrative law.
The landscape was altered by the enactment of I.R.C. § 7522 in
197
1988. It provides that for any IRS notice to which the section
applies, the IRS is required both to identify the amounts of liability it
198
has determined and to state “the basis” for the determination. This
requirement applies to notices of deficiency, postassessment notices
and demands for payment, notices generated by IRS informationreturn matching programs, and revenue agent reports (thirty-day
199
letters).
Section 7522 “does not articulate specific standards for
determining whether the description of the Commissioner’s basis is
200
adequate.” Interpreting this section, courts have reached three
conclusions. First, the notice must contain enough information to
allow the taxpayer to craft a meaningful Tax Court petition
201
challenging the notice. Second, § 7522 does not require the IRS to
identify the statutory provisions supporting the adjustments in the

194. E.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 442 (1976).
195. Ruth v. United States, 823 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987). Again, this rule operates
only in “rare cases,” that is, “[i]n certain quite limited circumstances.” Id.
196. E.g., United States v. Lehigh, 201 F. Supp. 224, 232–34 (W.D. Ark. 1961).
197. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6233, 102
Stat. 3342, 3735 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7522 (2012)).
198. I.R.C. § 7522(a).
199. Id. § 7522(b). The Senate bill would have applied the direction more broadly, and the
Conference Committee stated: “Although the provision is limited to the specified notices, the
conferees expect the IRS to make every effort to improve the clarity of all notices and
explanations that are sent to taxpayers.” H.R. REP. NO. 100-1104, pt. 2, at 219 (1988) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5048, 5279.
200. Shea v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 183, 196 n.20 (1999), nonacq., 2000-44 I.R.B. 430.
201. Caldwell v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 38, 49 (2011), aff’d, 483 F. App’x 847 (4th Cir. 2012).
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202

notice. Third, the IRS does not have to set out the factual bases of
203
its determinations.
Section 7522 imposes an obligation of explanation on the IRS
but no judicial remedy if the IRS fails to meet that obligation. It
provides: “An inadequate description . . . shall not invalidate such
204
notice.” Yet violation of § 7522 is not costless to the IRS. Taxpayer
complaints may catch the ear of Congress. Moreover, the Tax Court
has held that, when the IRS violates § 7522, the burden of proof on
205
the issue can shift to the IRS.
Thus, even without judicial
enforcement, the IRS has reasons to take § 7522 seriously.
One commentator questions the continuing vitality of the above
cases in light of State Farm and other APA case law, finding § 7522 to
206
be insufficient protection for taxpayers. He proposes that a level of
APA reasoned-explanation analysis be added to existing dimensions
of judicial review of deficiency determinations. In addition, some
judges have supported applying APA judicial-review standards to
207
deficiency cases involving equitable spousal relief.
Courts often apply a type of harmless-error analysis to uphold
explanations of less than ideal clarity. They do so in cases in which the
taxpayer received additional information from other sources more or
less related to the IRS notice, such that the taxpayer was not
prejudiced. There are similar cases involving explanatory challenges
208
to notices of deficiency, although they are fewer in number.
One category of deficiency litigation deserves particular
attention. The IRS has elaborate review mechanisms to promote
decisional consistency. Nonetheless, because of changed views of law

202. E.g., Wheeler v. Comm’r, 127 T.C. 200, 205 (2006), aff’d, 521 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2008).
203. E.g., Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 105, 113 (2009), aff’d, 613 F.3d 1360
(11th Cir. 2010).
204. I.R.C. § 7522(a).
205. Shea, 112 T.C. at 197; see also Ludwig v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 961, 963 (1994)
(suggesting that, in appropriate cases, courts might shift the burden of proof to the government
when the IRS violates § 7522(a)); cf. Sellers v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 135, 138–39 (2000)
(considering whether the government should bear the burden of proof, but concluding that the
notice of deficiency was nonetheless adequate).
206. See generally Smith, supra note 15.
207. See supra note 16.
208. See, e.g., Bitker v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 72, 78–79 (2003) (evaluating a notice of
deficiency issued to partners in light of explanations set out in IRS notices issued to his
partnership); see also TAX CT. R. 160 (establishing a harmless-error rule under which the Tax
Court “at every stage of case will disregard any error or defect which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties”).
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or policy or simply because of the volume of cases it handles, the IRS
sometimes takes a position in one case that is, or appears to be,
incompatible with positions it took in prior cases or in published
guidance.
A substantial body of case law has grown up in this area, but the
doctrine is in shambles. Numerous views have been offered in the
209
cases and commentary, but no settled rule exists. Many cases say
that there is no judicially enforceable duty of consistency on the
210
211
IRS, but many other cases say there is.
Authorities supporting the existence of a judicially enforceable
212
duty often are vague about the legal basis for the duty. Borrowing
from general administrative law, Professor Lawrence Zelenak has
proposed that the IRS be bound to its prior position unless, in the
later case, it explains why the positions are consistent or why its later
213
view is better than the view it is repudiating. Professor Zelenak
suggests three main possible sources for such a duty: agency-specific
(that is, tax) statutes, administrative common law, or the APA
214
arbitrary-and-capricious standard.
One candidate statute is
I.R.C. § 7805(b), which allows the IRS to prescribe the extent to
215
which tax rulings “shall be applied without retroactive effect.”
209. See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer, Hobgoblins of Little Minds No More: Justice Requires an
IRS Duty of Consistency, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 317, 318–19 (proposing imposition of a “duty of
consistency” on IRS actions against taxpayers); Timothy Jacobs, Barnes Group: Tax Court
Turns Blind Eye to Ravenhorst, 140 TAX NOTES 481, 481 (2013) (arguing that a recent Tax
Court decision permitting the IRS to argue against revenue rulings is “unworkable”); Steve R.
Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency: The Failure of Common Law Making and Proposed
Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 563, 567–68 (2010) (suggesting that taxpayers should be
able to show reliance on “high-level Treasury or IRS positions” that are “later contradicted or
disregarded”).
210. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72–76 (1965) (holding that the IRS may
retroactively withdraw an acquiescence in Tax Court rulings); Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v.
Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 133–34 (1936) (agreeing with lower courts that an amended Treasury
regulation governs stock transaction).
211. See, e.g., Estate of McLendon v. Comm’r, 135 F.3d 1017, 1024 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
Commissioner may not retroactively abrogate a ruling in an unclear area with respect to any
taxpayer who has relied on it.”); Powell v. United States, 945 F.2d 374, 377–78 (11th Cir. 1991)
(noting that taxpayers may argue “administrative inconsistency”).
212. See, e.g., Vesco v. Comm’r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 101, 129–30 (1979) (ruling against the IRS
in a deficiency case for disparate treatment of differing taxpayers but not explaining from where
such a duty of consistency comes).
213. Zelenak, supra note 15, at 412 (citing DAVIS, supra note 15, § 8.9, at 198).
214. Id. at 413–14 & n.14. In extreme cases of invidious discrimination, he adds a fourth
possible source, the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST., amend. V.
215. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(8) (2012). Courts have construed this section as creating a
presumption in favor of retroactivity but allowing taxpayers to challenge retroactive
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However, most of the inconsistency cases do not root their result in
that section. Moreover, the zest with which some courts once
deployed administrative common law has been chilled by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
216
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
That leaves the arbitrary-and-capricious standard as the best
foundation for a duty of the IRS to explain or repudiate. If (a big
“if”) the cases imposing a consistency duty are right, their best hope
for a sound mooring is in the reasoned-explanation requirement.
2. Jeopardy and Termination Determinations. The IRS must,
within five days of making a jeopardy or termination assessment or
levy, provide the taxpayer “a written statement of the information
217
upon which [it] relied in making such assessment or levy.” The
object “is to give the taxpayer notice of the information on which the
government relies so that the taxpayer may raise any available
218
defenses.”
The principal grounds justifying a jeopardy or termination
assessment are that collection is imperiled because the taxpayer
either appears to be hiding himself; appears to be hiding, transferring,
219
or dissipating his assets; or is insolvent. As the cases cited below
show, several decades ago, five-day notifications sometimes just
parroted these conditions without giving any supporting details or,
even worse, just said, in words or effect, “you are acting in ways that
imperil collection.” Such statements are insufficient to meet the
220
underlying purpose of the notification requirement.

applications on an abuse-of-discretion standard. E.g., Manocchio v. Comm’r, 710 F.2d 1400,
1403 (9th Cir. 1983); Lesavoy Found. v. Comm’r, 238 F.2d 589, 593–94 (3d Cir. 1956).
216. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978); see id. at 543 (instructing lower courts not to impose on agencies procedural
requirements beyond those in the APA and enabling acts absent “constitutional constraints or
extremely compelling circumstances”).
217. I.R.C. § 7429(a)(1)(B).
218. Zion Coptic Church, Inc. v. United States, No. 78-1984-CIV-WMH, 1979 WL 1333, at
*2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 1979).
219. I.R.C. § 6851(a)(1); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6851-1(a) (as amended in 1978), 301.6861-1(a) (as
amended in 1995), 301.6862-1(a) (as amended in 1982). Many courts have also considered
additional circumstances, especially criminal activity by the taxpayer. See, e.g., Albury v. United
States, Nos. 88-0788-CIV-RYSKAMP, 88-0789-CIV-RYSKAMP, 1988 WL 125768, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 9, 1988) (“[A]n indication that a taxpayer is engaged in criminal activity is significant
in assessing whether the taxpayer is likely to conceal his assets.”).
220. Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255–56 (2006) (refusing to accord deference to
an agency’s interpretation of a regulation that merely parroted the statutory language).
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Two lines of cases arose with respect to insufficient § 7429
statements. In the first line, courts that were initially indulgent of
conclusory notifications became increasingly frustrated by the IRS’s
practice of continuing to issue such notifications despite judicial
rebuke. They asserted that jeopardy and termination assessments
could be abated because of inadequately explanatory five-day
221
notifications, they threatened to order such abatement should
222
violations persist,
and they sometimes actually did order
223
abatement.
These cases did not make clear the basis upon which the courts
claimed authority to invalidate assessments for inadequate
explanation. Presumably, as in the cases invalidating deficiency
notices for inadequate explanation, the basis was in the interpretation
of the applicable tax statute, here, § 7429(a)(1)(B).
In these cases, however, there are occasional hints that
administrative-law principles may also have been at work. In one
case, the IRS sought to justify its termination assessment on the
grounds that the taxpayer was attempting to conceal both himself and
224
his assets. The court refused to consider these grounds because they
225
were not set out in the five-day notification. This is black-letter
226
227
administrative law under Chenery I, but it is bad tax law. Thus,
either the court misunderstood tax law, or it was glossing tax law with
administrative law. Another case compared the § 7429 reasonableness
221. See, e.g., Hirschhorn v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 887, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding
that omission of IRS conclusions from a termination notice “would be fatal to that
assessment”); Berkery v. United States, 544 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (acknowledging that a
mere letter announcing a termination agreement would be insufficient notice, but concluding
that the IRS provided the taxpayer with sufficient documentary support); Barry v. United
States, 534 F. Supp. 304, 308 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (noting that a threadbare statement that the
taxpayer’s gambling warranted a termination assessment would constitute invalid notice but
that the government provided various enclosures tying it to the taxpayer’s gambling records in
this case).
222. See, e.g., DeLauri v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 442, 444–45 (W.D. Tex. 1980)
(reasoning that the taxpayer’s refusal to provide information counseled against abatement but
that it would be necessitated by inadequate IRS notice in future proceedings).
223. See, e.g., Walker v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 877, 885 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (abating a
jeopardy assessment when the IRS notice was “completely bare” of supporting information).
224. Hirschhorn, 662 F. Supp. at 891.
225. Id.
226. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
227. It is settled that in a § 7429 review proceeding, the court may consider all relevant
grounds and information, whether known when the assessment was made or discovered only
later. E.g., Loretto v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 1168, 1173–74 (E.D. Pa. 1977); S. REP. NO. 94–
938, at 364–65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3793–94.
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standard to two APA standards. It concluded that the § 7429 standard
is somewhat more demanding than “arbitrary[] [and] capricious”
under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), but somewhat less demanding than
228
“substantial evidence” under § 706(2)(E).
Cases of the second line are considerably more numerous. They
found conclusory five-day notifications to be insufficient but refused
to invalidate them. These cases applied a harmless-error approach—
although they cited neither 5 U.S.C. § 706 nor any other source of a
229
harmless-error rule. The cases excused defective explanations
because the taxpayers suffered insufficient prejudice. The information
omitted from the five-day notifications was received by the taxpayers
by way of either informal production before the hearing, formal
230
discovery before the hearing, or prior proceedings against the IRS.
3. CDP Determinations. Although there are differences, CDP
bears similarities to the jeopardy-and-termination regime just
231
discussed. First, at least in theory, as to most issues, the CDP
232
standard of proof is deferential: abuse of discretion as to CDP and
reasonableness as to jeopardy and termination assessments and
levies.
Second, as seen in the preceding Section, jeopardy-andtermination review is not limited to the record made by the IRS.
Similarly, the Tax Court claims the ability to go outside the record in
233
CDP cases, although this ability is controversial.
One can

228. Loretto, 440 F. Supp. at 1172.
229. E.g., Hagaman v. United States, No. CIV-1-90-75, 1990 WL 86017, at *1 (E.D. Tenn.
Apr. 10, 1990); Revis v. United States, 558 F. Supp. 1071, 1076 (D.R.I. 1983).
230. E.g., Hagaman, 1990 WL 86017, at *1; Revis, 558 F. Supp. at 1076.
231. The Tax Court and generalist courts often use the same words but are animated by
different spirits in applying them. Abuse-of-discretion review in the Tax Court is notably stricter
than such review in the district and circuit courts. See, e.g., Dalton v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 149, 155
(1st Cir. 2012), rev’g 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1653 (2011) (“[A] court cannot be expected to conduct
the same level of judicial review that would follow, say, a bench trial or a more formal agency
proceeding.”); see also Cords, supra note 21, at 441 (explaining the basis for using different
standards of review).
232. E.g., Jones v. Comm’r, 338 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2003). Some circuits are even more
deferential: “[L]est the judiciary become involved on a daily basis with tax enforcement details
that Congress intended to leave with the IRS.” Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 459 (8th Cir.
2006).
233. E.g., Robinette, 439 F.3d at 459–62, rev’g 123 T.C. 85, 96–104 (2004). See generally
Christine K. Lane, On-the-Record Review of CDP Determinations: An Examination of Policy
Reasons Encouraging Judges To Stick to the Administrative Record, 6 FLA. ST. U. BUS. L. REV.
149 (2007).
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understand the temptation to go outside the record because it often is
234
However, “Congress knew about the
sparse in CDP cases.
235
incomplete nature of the record that would be available”; taxpayers
often are the ones responsible for record gaps because they failed to
236
provide information requested by the IRS; and “[i]t is a basic
principle of administrative law that review of administrative decisions
is ‘ordinarily limited to consideration of the decision of the
237
agency . . . and of the evidence on which it was based.’”
Third, as seen in Part III.A.2, some courts in the jeopardy-andtermination context asserted the power to invalidate assessments and
levies when the IRS notification failed to explain the bases of the
IRS’s determination. Similarly, courts in CDP cases have often found
notices of determination to be inadequately explanatory,
238
necessitating remand to the Appeals Office. In practical terms, CDP
remand and jeopardy-and-termination invalidation have much the
same effect. Remand stops the IRS’s intended collection action, but
the IRS will later be able to proceed if it develops a satisfactorily
reasoned explanation. Similarly, when its first jeopardy or
termination assessment or levy is invalidated, the IRS can make a
second one, hopefully to be adequately explained in the new five-day
notification.

234. In CDP review there is no obligation to conduct a face-to-face hearing, no formal
discovery, and no requirement for testimony, cross examination, or a transcript. The hearing
usually consists of informal oral and written communication between the taxpayer and the IRS.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2)A-D6 (as amended in 2006).
235. Dalton, 682 F.3d at 156.
236. E.g., Olsen v. Comm’r, 414 F.3d, 144, 149, 151 (1st Cir. 2005).
237. Robinette, 439 F.3d at 459 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 714–15 (1963)). And, outside the APA context, when
Congress provides for judicial review without defining its scope and procedures, normally
“consideration is to be confined to the administrative record.” Bianchi, 373 U.S. at 715.
238. E.g., Mesa Oil, Inc. v. United States, No. CIV-A. 00-B-851, 2000 WL 1745280, at *4–5
(D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2000), nonacq., 2001-2 C.B. 176; Salahuddin v. Comm’r, No. 7050-11L, 2012
WL 1758628, at *7 (T.C. May 17, 2012); Leago v. Comm’r, No. 13070-08L, 2012 WL 407493, at
*9 (T.C. Feb. 9, 2012); Fairlamb v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 1103, 1107 (2010); Hoyle v.
Comm’r, 131 T.C. 197, 204–05 (2008); Oman v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.M (CCH) 372, 375–76 (2006).
The IRS agrees that remand is appropriate when the appeals officer “failed to make
necessary findings of fact” or “failed to perform an analysis that is necessary in making the
determination” and when “the administrative record contains no indication of the documents or
evidence the officer considered in making the determination or the reasons for the
determination.” I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice 2004-031, Litigating Cases Brought Under I.R.C.
§§ 6320(c) and 6330(d) (2004), available at http://www.unclefed.com/ForTaxProfs/irs-ccdm/2004/
cc-2004-031.pdf.
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Fourth, in the CDP situation, as in the jeopardy-and-termination
situation, it is unclear on what authority the courts relied in
fashioning their remedies. The CDP courts ordering remand did not
invoke the APA, but neither did they assert any other basis of
authority. Some courts did cite Chenery I in discarding rationales not
239
stated in the notice of determination.
This matter is unlikely to be settled as long as a more
fundamental difference between the Tax Court and some generalist
courts remains unresolved. The Tax Court has declared: “[W]hen
reviewing for abuse of discretion [for CDP purposes], we are not
240
241
limited by the [APA],” a view rejected by some generalist courts.
The Tax Court took a similar position as to equitable spousal relief
242
under I.R.C. § 6015.
Part of the Tax Court’s rationale is that the APA does not apply
243
244
to courts, and the Tax Court is a court. Right premises, wrong
245
conclusion. The Tax Court surely is a court. Indeed, its predecessor,
although formally an administrative agency, was “in its essentials
246
practically a court of record” as far back as 1924. But that is beside
the point. The APA is law that is applied by a court when reviewing
239. E.g., Salahuddin, 2012 WL 1758628, at *7; see Fairlamb, 99 T.C.M (CCH) at 1106–07
(using the Chenery I principle but not citing the case by name); cf. Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d
1129, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting Chenery I but rejecting the taxpayer’s argument based on it).
240. Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 95 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006).
Despite being reversed in Robinette, the Tax Court clings to its view. E.g., Oropeza v. Comm’r,
95 T.C.M (CCH) 1367, 1369 (2008).
241. E.g., Robinette, 439 F.3d at 461; Olsen, 414 F.3d at 155.
242. See Ewing v. United States, 122 T.C. 32, 37–38 (2004) (“[T]he APA does not apply to
deficiency cases in this Court . . . . We see no material difference between [equitable spousal
relief under § 6015] and [deficiency cases] . . . .”), rev’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006).
243. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B) (2012).
244. E.g., Robinette, 123 T.C. at 96; Nappi v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 282, 284 (1972). Surprisingly,
some have accepted, or nearly accepted, this misguided analysis. E.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705
F.3d 980, 990 n.16 (9th Cir. 2013). Despite the above protestation, the Tax Court has applied the
APA in some situations. E.g., Mailman v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 1079, 1082–83 (1988); Estate of
Gardner v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 989, 994 (1984); Dittler Bros. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 896, 909–10
(1979), aff’d, 642 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1981).
245. E.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 890–91 (1991); see Steve R. Johnson, The
Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court
Decisions Is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REV. 235, 280–82 (1998).
246. See DUBROFF, supra note 133, at 66 (reprinting President Calvin Coolidge’s signing
statement of the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336, creating the Board of
Tax Appeals). Nonetheless, the formal status of the Tax Court was an agency, not a court, at the
time the APA was enacted. See generally Malvern B. Fink, Note, Effect of the Administrative
Procedure Act on Decisions of the Tax Court, 2 TAX L. REV. 103 (1946).
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agency action, not law applied to the court. The question is not
whether the Tax Court is exempt from the APA, but whether the IRS
247
is.
The true roots of the Tax Court’s reluctance are cultural.
Throughout its existence, the Tax Court has been accustomed to
conducting de novo proceedings. The Article III federal courts are far
more familiar with APA–style review. This difference in experience is
reflected in other aspects of the Tax Court’s often less-than-stellar
treatment of administrative law, such as its foot-dragging on accepting
the standard of review set out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
248
Resources Defense Council Inc., its embrace of the government’s
benighted understanding of the difference between legislative and
249
interpretive regulations, and its turning of supposedly deferential
250
review into virtual de novo review in many cases.
4. Trust Fund Recovery Penalty Determinations. The explanatory
adequacy of sixty-day letters has not thus far been subject to
251
substantial litigation. Somewhat similar issues have been raised as
to another part of the § 6672 regime, however, and courts’ treatment
of these issues suggests that they will behave in the § 6672 area in like
252
fashion to how they behave in other IRS adjudication contexts.
After the IRS has assessed § 6672 liabilities, I.R.C. § 6203
provides that the assessed person is entitled, upon request, to receive
247. E.g., Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 461 n.5 (8th Cir. 2006).
248. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see, e.g.,
Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96, 129–31 (2006), rev’d, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir.
2008).
249. E.g., Wing v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 17, 26–28 (1983). For description of the government’s
understanding of the distinction and why that understanding is wrong, see Steve R. Johnson,
Swallows as It Might Have Been: Regulations Revising Case Law, 112 TAX NOTES 773, 780–81
(2006).
250. See, e.g., Book, supra note 7, at 1194–97; Cords, supra note 21, at 445.
251. The current regime was enacted in 1996. Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 104-168,
§§ 901–903, 110 Stat. 1452, 1465–67 (1996) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6672 (2012)). A
§ 6672 target raised the sixty-day-letter issue in one case, but the court properly did not consider
it because the relevant events happened before the 1996 effective date. United States v. Long,
No. 4:CV-97-1432, 1999 WL 250737, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1999). In another case, the
assessed person failed to raise the adequate-reasoning argument at trial, jeopardizing his ability
to advance it on appeal. See Brief for the Appellee at 20, Nakano v. Comm’r, No. 12-70992 (9th
Cir. Aug. 22, 2012), 2012 WL 3835216, at *20.
252. Although limited law exists on the point, there may be at least one difference. As seen
in Part III.A.1 above, the Tax Court has held that inadequate explanation can shift the burden
of proof to the IRS in the deficiency contest. A district court has refused to do so in the § 6672
context. Curley v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 52, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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a copy of the record of assessment from the IRS. This consists of the
summary record and supporting records providing “identification of
the taxpayer, the character of the liability assessed, the taxable
253
period . . . and the amount of the assessment.” This is all required
by the statute and regulations.
Targets sometimes have complained that the information
provided by the IRS contained defects or omissions, requiring
254
invalidation of the assessment. In such cases, “[g]enerally courts are
liberal in finding that an assessment has been properly made and
255
technical defects are ignored in the absence of prejudice.” In some
cases, there was no prejudice because the erroneous or missing
256
information was inconsequential or was not required by statute or
257
regulation. In other cases, there was no prejudice because the
assessed person received the missing information through other
258
means. Beyond the question of prejudice, some courts stated or
implied that notice defects, categorically, cannot invalidate an
259
otherwise proper assessment.
There are two lessons here. First, one way the target can receive
260
the missing information is through prior proceedings. This fits
the § 6672 situation. Under that section, the IRS seeks to impose
secondary liability on responsible persons of companies that do not
261
meet their obligations. The IRS’s actions against their companies

253. I.R.C. § 6203; Treas. Reg. § 301.6203-1 (1967).
254. See, e.g., Howell v. United States, 164 F.3d 523, 524 (10th Cir. 1998) (reversing the
district court decision for the assessed person); Attick v. United States, 904 F. Supp. 77, 80 (D.
Conn. 1995) (denying the government’s motion for summary judgment initially, but then
granting the motion after the IRS provided additional information).
255. In re Dewberry, 158 B.R. 979, 982 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993) (citing Planned Invs., Inc.
v. United States, 881 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1989)).
256. E.g., Conway v. Comm’r, 137 T.C. 209, 217 (2012).
257. E.g., Allan v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 499, 504 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff’d, 514 F.2d 1070
(5th Cir. 1975); see Curley v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 52, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (“It appears
that the IRM guidelines were not followed. However, . . . the provisions of the IRM are not law
and do not create any substantive rights in [the assessed person].”).
258. E.g., Anuforo v. Comm’r, 614 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 2010); Curley, 791 F. Supp. at 56.
259. Howell, 164 F.3d at 526.
260. Cf. Evans v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 1118, 1125 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (holding that a
taxpayer failed to show prejudice when, although a jeopardy assessment might have been
inadequate on its face, the taxpayer had notice of the information obtained from discovery in
four pending criminal indictments); Zion Coptic Church, Inc. v. United States, No. 78-1984CIV-WMH, 1979 WL 1333, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 1979) (holding that the taxpayer had actual
notice by virtue of a similar jeopardy-assessment case as to a transferee of the taxpayer’s).
261. I.R.C. § 6672 (2012).
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typically provide target owners and officers with substantial
information bearing on their potential § 6672 liabilities.
Second, Chenery I—a bedrock of administrative-law reasonedexplanation analysis—applies weakly here. The target unsuccessfully
262
made a Chenery-like argument in one § 6672 case. This lack of
success is unsurprising. Many cases noted above allowed the IRS to
remedy initial imprecisions and omissions by subsequent disclosure.
This harmless-error approach largely swallows Chenery I in this
context.
B. The Practice of IRS Explanations
This Section advances two conclusions. First, IRS determinations
usually provide meaningful explanation. Second, however, courts
have varied widely in the detail they demand of agency explanations
under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Accordingly, it is
possible, indeed likely, that some IRS determinations would be
invalidated if the APA’s reasoned-explanation requirement were held
to be applicable to IRS adjudications.
1. Current Level of Explanation. A 1976 Tax Court case stated:
Here, we have a vague notice of deficiency, that is, a notice of
deficiency in which the [IRS] makes a determination that may be
based on any one of a number of grounds but in which [it] fails to
advise the taxpayer of the grounds on which [the IRS] relies. For
years, such notices of deficiency have created problems in
263
proceedings in this Court.

Similarly, “[c]ommentators have long complained about the
264
inadequacy of the explanation portion of many statutory notices.”
But most such complaints preceded 1988. The IRS received wakeup
265
266
calls in 1987 in Scar v. Commissioner and in 1988 in I.R.C. § 7522,
and the quality of its explanations has improved.

262. See Howell v. Rogers, 164 F.3d 523, 525 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting a taxpayer’s
argument that supporting documents as to the § 6203 record must have been prepared
contemporaneously with the assessment).
263. Estate of Allensworth v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 33, 34 (1976).
264. Lederman, supra note 159, at 224; see also Mary Ferrari, “Was Blind but Now I See”
(Or What’s Behind the Notice of Deficiency and Why Won’t the Tax Court Look?), 55 ALB. L.
REV. 407, 437–45 (1991) (discussing cases).
265. Scar v. Comm’r, 814 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1987).
266. For discussion of Scar and § 7522, see supra Part III.A.1.

JOHNSON FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1814

4/21/2014 9:15 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1771

The Internal Revenue Manual sets out procedures for IRS
267
personnel drafting notices of deficiency. Deficiency notices contain
several components. First is a letter stating the taxpayer’s name and
address, the type of tax, the tax period, and the amount of the
deficiency plus any penalties asserted. The letter also informs the
taxpayer of the availability of Tax Court review. Next in the
deficiency notice is a waiver form for taxpayers who wish to forgo Tax
Court by consenting to immediate assessment. This is followed by a
listing of the adjustments determined by the IRS along with a
recomputation of tax liability based on the adjustments, accompanied
by one or more pages explaining, in one or more paragraphs per
268
adjustment, why each adjustment is being made. These explanatory
paragraphs have two purposes: first, “[t]o inform the taxpayer in clear
and concise language of the adjustments,” and second, “[t]o state the
269
position or positions of the IRS with respect to the adjustments.”
Poorly explained notices of deficiency sometimes sneak through IRS
review processes, but the frequency of this failure has declined.
A similar story can be told about jeopardy- and terminationassessment notices. Part III.A.2 above rehearsed the case law as to
270
the explanation of such determinations. Overwhelmingly, the cases
explained in this section are from the 1970s and 1980s. The increased
care with which the IRS has prepared notices of deficiency since 1988
has spilled over into how the IRS prepares jeopardy and termination
notifications.
The situation as to CDP determinations remains mixed,
271
however. In many cases, such determinations are amply explained.
272
In other cases, unfortunately, the same cannot be said.

267. IRM 4.8.9.8–4.8.9.9 (July 9, 2013).
268. E.g., Straight v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1457, 1461–62 (1997), rev’d, No. 23658-94,
1999 WL 33587419 (T.C. May 6, 1999).
269. IRM 4.8.9.8.6 (July 9, 2013).
270. See supra Part III.A.2.
271. E.g., Jackson v. United States, No. Civ-06-643-D, 2010 WL 1372486, at *4 (W.D. Okla.
Mar. 31, 2010) (finding that the notice of determination analyzed each of thirteen potentially
relevant considerations); Bennett v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 319, 321 (2008) (noting that the
IRS “has diligently presented an exhaustive narrative to justify [its] conclusion”).
272. E.g., Mesa Oil, Inc. v. United States, No. Civ.A. 00-B-851, 2000 WL 1745280, at *4 (D.
Colo. Nov. 21, 2000) (explaining that the notice of determination included “no statement of
facts, no legal analysis, and no explanation of how or why the proposed levy balanced the need
for collection with [the taxpayer’s] interests,” but instead contained a mere “blank recitation of
the statute”), nonacq., 2001-2 C.B. 176.
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2. Comparison to APA Explanation. “Arbitrary and capricious”
is flexible language. The spirit in which the standard is applied
matters more than the verbal formulation. As seen in Part I.B, courts
vary in the degree of detail and specificity they require. Thus, one
could reasonably expect that, were an APA–style reasonedexplanation requirement to be applied to IRS adjudications, some
courts would find the level of explanation that now prevails to suffice,
but others would not.
For example, assume that the taxpayer claimed loss deductions
on account of XYZ tax shelter and the IRS disallowed the deductions
because the shelter lacked economic substance. Under current law, in
cases “to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant,” the
taxpayer prevails only by showing both that the transactions changed
the taxpayer’s economic position “in a meaningful way” independent
of tax savings and that the taxpayer had a “substantial,” tax273
independent purpose for entering into the transaction. Various
274
special rules modify, define, or clarify these general requirements.
In a notice of deficiency in the above situation, what level of
specificity would be needed to satisfy the reasoned-explanation
requirement? There are multiple possibilities: First, the notice might
say: “Your loss deductions claimed as a result of XYZ are disallowed
because you have not established that XYZ had economic
substance.” This would give notice of the adjustment and the
conclusion on which the adjustment is based. Second, the notice
might say the above and then add: “You have not shown that the
economic substance doctrine is not relevant to this situation. You also
have not shown that the transaction had a meaningful economic effect
and/or that you had a substantial non-tax purpose for entering into
the transactions.” This would give notice of the adjustment, the
conclusion on which it is based, and the subsidiary conclusions that
are the elements of the main conclusion. Third, the notice might state
all of the above and then add specific findings of fact under one or
more of the subconclusions. Fourth, the notice might state all of the
above and add conclusions and findings of fact as to the special rules.
If a court held the first or second version satisfactory, there
would be little change from what prevails under existing tax
explanation requirements. Requiring the third or fourth version
would be a major change, and would invalidate many notices of
273. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (2012).
274. Id. §§ 7701(o)(2)–(5).
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deficiency. In all likelihood, different judges would choose different
versions. At least one commentator has predicted that the application
of an APA–style reasoned-explanation requirement would lead to
275
more taxpayer successes. Depending on the level of specificity
276
reviewing courts require, that prediction could prove correct.
IV. REASONED EXPLANATION AS TO
DEFICIENCY DETERMINATIONS
This Part considers whether it would be desirable to engraft an
APA–style reasoned-explanation requirement onto IRS deficiency
determinations, and whether it would be permissible to do so within
the existing state of the law. Such an engrafting would be neither wise
nor permissible under existing doctrine.
A. Policy Considerations
Parts I.D and I.E rehearsed the principal advantages and costs of
requiring reasoned explanations. This Part considers those
advantages most relevant to the notice-of-deficiency context and also
explores related considerations.
1. Possible Advantages. Part I.D noted the constitutional,
political-process, and decisional-quality benefits offered as
justifications for the reasoned-explanation requirement. However,
many of these benefits are more applicable to agency regulations—
which involve policy discretion and are subject to deferential
review—than to IRS notices of deficiency, which involve adjustments
to statutory rules and are subject to de novo review. For example,
there is little doubt that in making determinations of tax liability, the
IRS operates within the role assigned to it by Congress. In addition,
courts are less likely to stray outside their role when applying defined
statutory rules than when passing on value-laden regulatory choices
made by agencies. Political-process values are more obviously at
stake in the quasi-legislation of agency rulemaking than in
individualized tax liability determinations. And information

275. Smith, supra note 15, at 343.
276. For an example of explanatory paragraphs in the notice of deficiency, how a taxpayer
suggested they should have been written, and how the court chose between the proffered
alternatives, see Elliott v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 13, 16–19 (2001), aff’d, 54 F. App’x 413
(5th Cir. 2002).
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asymmetries in the latter context favor the taxpayer (who participated
in the transactions at issue) rather than the IRS.
A robust explanation requirement might promote good
ossification if it caused the IRS to abandon bad positions earlier in
the process. This would save taxpayers time, money, fear, and
frustration. However, the possibility of losing at trial—a genuine
possibility under a de novo standard of review—hopefully provides
adequate incentive to the IRS to sharpen its thought processes and to
277
avoid setting up bootless adjustments.
It sometimes is argued that the loose tax explanation regime
“encourages—even
rewards—vagueness
and
imprecision
278
in . . . deficiency notices.” However, the explanatory quality of
notices of deficiency appears to have improved, not deteriorated, in
recent decades. The various institutional costs of vagary described
279
earlier appear to be sufficient disincentives.
In short, tax law already contains tax-specific explanation rules.
Little would be gained by adding to them a possibly more robust
explanation requirement. Shifting the burden of proof to the IRS—
280
already possible —is a better-calibrated response.
2. Possible Costs.
As seen in Part I.E, concerns about
explanation requirements include fears of results-oriented
adjudication and administrative ossification. The first of these
concerns probably would not be significant in tax adjudications.
Courts occasionally have sought to massage flexible doctrine to favor
281
sympathetic taxpayers. However, most courts steel themselves to
the harshness that sometimes arises from technically correct

277. Moreover, the IRS risks the shifting to it of the taxpayer’s legal fees and other expenses
if it takes a substantially unjustified position at trial. I.R.C. § 7430.
278. Shea v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 183, 208 (1999) (Beghe, J., concurring), nonacq., 2000-44
I.R.B. 430.
279. See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
281. For example, I.R.C. § 7403 allows the IRS to seek judicial sale of property in which a
tax delinquent has an interest. Courts have limited equitable discretion to refuse to make such
sales. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 703–11 (1983). In sympathetic cases, district courts
sometimes abuse that limited discretion and have to be reined in. E.g., United States v. Winsper,
No. 3:08CV-631-H, 2010 WL 3829408 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 10, 2010), rev’d, 680 F.3d 482 (6th Cir.
2012).
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282

application of the tax laws, so problems in our contexts likely would
remain within tolerable bounds.
Bad ossification could occur, however, along with other
problems if an APA–style reasoned-explanation requirement was
superimposed upon notices of deficiency. The potential costs of such
an approach are described below.
a. Resources. Evaluating the adequacy of the explanations in
IRS notifications of deficiency is a preliminary exercise to the main
contest: deciding the merits in the de novo Tax Court or refund
litigation. At some point, the investment of time, money, and effort in
preliminary exercises becomes excessive for the IRS, the courts, and
283
the taxpayers themselves. Deficiency determinations, after all, are
284
informal, not formal, adjudications under the APA. For, judicial
review that is too exacting, especially on preliminary matters, “would
defeat the very purpose of . . . informal procedures before the
agency—saving time and effort in cases not worth detailed formal
285
consideration or not requiring a hearing on the record.”
Legal process should be administered with a sense of
286
287
proportion. The IRS audit rate already is quite low, which
288
contributes to a tax gap that is quite high. Time taken to write or
rewrite notices to satisfy exacting explanation requirements would be
289
time that could not be devoted to auditing more returns.
282. See, e.g., Kenseth v. Comm’r, 259 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is not a feasible
judicial undertaking to achieve global equity in taxation . . . . And if it were a feasible judicial
undertaking, it still would not be a proper one, equity in taxation being a political rather than a
jural concept.”); Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. 1967) (“[T]here is no
equity in tax law.”); Speltz v. Comm’r 124 T.C. 165, 176–77 (2005) (citing cases rejecting
challenges based on equity), aff’d, 454 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2006).
283. E.g., Clapp v. Comm’r, 875 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1989).
284. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
285. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 742–43 (1985).
286. See, e.g., Dalton v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 149, 154 (1st Cir. 2012) (“In the exercise of
powers of judicial review, one size does not fit all.”).
287. Currently, the IRS audits only about one out of every hundred returns filed, only about
one-fifth of the audit rate in the 1990s. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 135, at 95.
288. The IRS estimates that about $450 billion of taxes that should have been paid have not
been. Tax Gap “Map” Tax Year 2006, IRS (Dec. 2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/
tax_gap_map_2006.pdf.
289. The sheer number of deficiency notices adds to the concern. The IRS issued slightly
over 352,000 such notices in fiscal year 2012, of which only about .04 percent were challenged in
Tax Court. 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2012 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 82 n.43 (2012), available at http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/
userfiles/file/Full-Report/Volume-2.pdf.
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b. Role of the Courts. The role of the courts must also be
considered in assessing the costs of such an approach. Congress
charged the IRS, not the courts, with administering the I.R.C. In the
CDP and deficiency contexts, courts have warned about approaches
to review under which “the judiciary will inevitably become involved
on a daily basis with tax enforcement details that judges are neither
290
qualified, nor have the time, to administer.”
A jeopardy assessment/levy case illustrates this danger. In
291
Fidelity Equipment Leasing Corp. v. United States, contrary to usual
practice, a court imposed elaborate conditions on the parties,
292
assuming essentially a supervisory role. Predictably, this approach
failed, and the court was forced to retreat to essentially upholding the
293
assessment and levy. Subsequent courts have not repeated this
error.
Too exacting a review of explanations in deficiency notices
would risk such embroilment. Especially when de novo review is in
the offing, courts should confine preliminary review to broad strokes
rather than attempt to micromanage.
c. Horizontal Equity. When a court remands a regulation
because of inadequate explanation, all persons potentially subject to
the regulation are similarly affected. There may be different practical
consequences, but all are in formally the same position. In contrast,
IRS deficiency adjudications are individualized affairs. All taxpayers
are subject to the same statute, but case-by-case application creates
the possibility that similarly situated taxpayers may be treated
differently.
Part III.B.2 noted the likelihood that different judges would use
varying levels of rigor in applying an APA–style reasoned294
explanation requirement to deficiency determinations. Thus, there
would be times when a notice of deficiency would be invalidated in

290. See Living Care Alts. of Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 631 (6th Cir. 2005)
(writing in the CDP context); see also Scar v. Comm’r, 814 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1987)
(stating in the deficiency context that “courts should avoid oversight of the [IRS’s] internal
operations and the adequacy of procedures employed”).
291. Fid. Equip. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ga. 1978), vacated
in part, No. C78-1811A, 1981 WL 1755 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 1981).
292. Id. at 851–52.
293. Fid. Equip. Leasing Corp. v. United States, No. C78-1811A, 1981 WL 1755, at *9 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 12, 1981).
294. See supra Part III.B.2.
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one case while, in another case, a notice of no better explanatory
quality would be upheld. Considering the frequency of deficiency
litigation, such disparate outcomes would be inevitable. This result
would contravene horizontal equity, an important goal of our tax
295
system.
d. Decisional Accuracy. It sometimes happens that the IRS
Examination Division fails to recognize the best theory for a
particular adjustment or even misses legitimate adjustments entirely
during an audit. As a result, these theories and adjustments are not
included in notices of deficiency. The appropriate theories or
adjustments are discovered later by the government’s lawyer before
trial. Under current law, the government is allowed to raise the new
theory or adjustment in an answer or amended answer, as long as the
296
taxpayer is not seriously prejudiced thereby. If the new item alters
the original deficiency or requires different evidence, the burden of
proof will be on the IRS. Otherwise, the burden will (typically)
297
remain on the taxpayer.
The IRS’s ability to raise such new matters can be important to
accurately determining tax liability. For instance, in one case the
taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court with respect to approximately
$16,000 of liability determined in the deficiency notice. However, IRS
counsel identified, raised, and won a new issue, resulting in the
298
taxpayer being liable for approximately $1,025,000. Would the IRS
still be able to raise such new matters in an APA–style reasonedexplanation environment? Strict application of the Chenery I
299
principle might suggest a negative answer, which would undermine
decisional accuracy.

295. E.g., Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948); Ogiony v. Comm’r, 617 F.2d 14, 18
(2d Cir. 1980) (Oakes, J., concurring). But see generally James R. Repetti & Diane M. Ring,
Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 135 (2012) (maintaining that horizontal equity
lacks normative content and should be understood as part of vertical equity).
296. See TAX CT. R. 41(a) (allowing liberal amendment of pleadings in the interest of
justice).
297. Id. 142(a)(1); see Carlebach v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 1, 14 (2012).
298. Raskob v. Comm’r, 37 B.T.A. 1283, 1283 (1938), aff’d sub nom. Du Pont v. Comm’r,
118 F.2d 544, 548 (3d Cir. 1941); cf. Trans Miss. Corp. v. United States, 494 F.2d 770 (5th Cir.
1974) (claimed refund of $78,000 turned into an additional liability of over $370,000 as a result
of a new item raised by the government).
299. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
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e. Revenue Effect. As shown in Part I.C above, the typical
remedy for an insufficient explanation is remand to the agency.
However, many notices of deficiency are issued at or near the end of
300
the statute-of-limitations period for assessing liabilities. If the
limitations period continues to run in remand situations, the IRS will
often be time-barred from assessing legitimate liabilities.
Normally, the running of the limitations period is tolled by the
301
issuance of a deficiency notice, but there is doubt as to whether an
invalid notice effects tolling. On harmless-error grounds, some cases
have allowed tolling when there is only a technical defect in the notice
302
and the taxpayer is not prejudiced. But other cases have held that
303
invalid notices did not suspend the running of the limitations period.
Some courts say categorically that “[a]n invalid notice of deficiency
does not suspend the running of the period of limitations for
304
assessment.” Thus, there is a substantial chance that notices held
invalid for inadequate explanation would be found not to suspend the
305
running of the limitations period. Were this to be the case, adoption
of a stricter explanation rule would come at a heavy cost to revenue.
B. Legal Necessity
As shown in Part IV.A, the policy arguments against stricter
explanation requirements for IRS deficiency determinations outweigh
306
the policy arguments in their favor. But policy, although relevant, is
not dispositive. Even an unfortunate regime must be obeyed as long
307
as it is the law.
Thus, this Section asks whether stricter
requirements, even if unfortunate, nonetheless are compelled by law.

300. Unless an exception applies, the IRS must assess additional liabilities within three years
of the later of when the return was filed or when it was due to be filed. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2012);
see, e.g., Jones v. United States, 60 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 1995); Stallard v. United States, 12
F.3d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1994).
301. I.R.C. § 6503(a)(1).
302. E.g., St. Joseph Lease Capital Corp. v. Comm’r, 235 F.3d 886, 888–92 (4th Cir. 2000).
303. E.g., Mulvania v. Comm’r, 769 F.2d 1376, 1380–81 (9th Cir. 1985); Weber v. Comm’r, 46
T.C.M. (CCH) 1568, 1570 (1983); Reddock v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 21, 27–28 (1979), acq., 1979-2
C.B. 1.
304. Napoliello v. Comm’r, 655 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Shockley v.
Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1451, 1456 (2011), rev’d, 686 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2012)).
305. See Smith, supra note 15, at 345 (taking this view).
306. See supra Part IV.A.
307. Cf., e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 746 (1985) (stating that the
rule adopted “must of course be governed by the intent of Congress and not by any views we
may have about sound policy”).
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It concludes that they are not, and that there are powerful reasons to
believe that the law precludes the application of such requirements in
the context of IRS deficiency determinations.
There are two principal legal obstacles to applying the APA–
style reasoned-explanation analysis to tax deficiency cases: first, the
general APA standards are preempted by the specific, de novo
deficiency review procedures, and second, application of the APA
standard would contravene I.R.C. § 7522, a conflict the APA does not
countenance. These obstacles are developed below.
1. Preemption. For tax traditionalists, this is not an open
question. The standards set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706 are available to a
308
“reviewing court.” Over a half century ago, the Fourth Circuit
309
declared in O’Dwyer v. Commissioner that “the Tax Court, rather
than being a ‘reviewing court’, within the meaning of [the APA]
reviewing the ‘record’, is a court in which the facts are triable de
310
novo . . . . [T]he Tax Court is not subject to the [APA].” Many other
311
judges have been equally emphatic in subsequent cases.
But the matter is hardly settled. O’Dwyer has been criticized as
being “premised on a now outmoded understanding” of
312
administrative law. And the notion that the Tax Court (or, in a
refund action, the district court or Court of Federal Claims) is not a
“reviewing court” is debatable. When the court decides a case
involving a notice of deficiency, an ordinary-meaning approach would
313
surely see the court as reviewing the notice. The contrary approach

308. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
309. O’Dwyer v. Comm’r, 266 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1959).
310. Id. at 580.
311. E.g., Bratcher v. Comm’r, No. 96-3877, 1997 WL 334976, at *2 (7th Cir. June 5, 1997);
Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 37 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006);
cf. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 105 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (making a similar argument
in the context of disciplinary proceedings brought under securities laws); ASG Inds., Inc. v.
United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200, 1234 (Cust. Ct. 1979) (citing O’Dwyer in making the same
argument regarding the former U.S. Customs Court). In a 2013 unpublished order, the Tax
Court reaffirmed its adherence to O’Dwyer in rejecting an APA-based challenge to the
sufficiency of explanations in a notice of deficiency. QinetiQ U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, No.
14122-13, at 2–3 (T.C. Dec. 27, 2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
312. Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Ewing, 122 T.C. at 61
(Halpern and Holmes, JJ., dissenting) ( “[T]he continuing relevance of the APA discussion in
O’Dwyer is dubious at best.”). But see Porter v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 131 & n.3 (2008)
(Thornton, J., concurring) (defending O’Dwyer).
313. Indeed, even judges sympathetic to the O’Dwyer view sometimes describe Tax Court
deficiency proceedings as “review.” E.g., Ewing, 122 T.C. at 52 (Thornton, J., concurring).
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is based on the idea that, to be a reviewing court, the court must be
confined to the administrative record. But it seems unduly narrow to
say that a court cannot be a reviewing court just because it is
314
empowered to hear evidence that the agency did not consider.
Although there are substantial arguments on both sides, the
traditional view is preferable: de novo review of deficiency notices
should preclude the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious review of such
notices. As shown below, the traditional view, although not
compelled by the plain language of the APA, is the better
construction of the statute.
a. Statutory Text. Many APA provisions are suggestive, but none
are dispositive, as to the preemption question. First, 5 U.S.C. § 554
defines procedures governing agency adjudication, but it excludes
from its reach all matters “subject to a subsequent trial of the law and
315
the facts de novo in a court.” The legislative history of the APA
confirms that the Tax Court’s review of deficiency notices falls within
316
this exception. However, § 554 governs formal agency adjudication,
and IRS adjudication is informal.
Second, 5 U.S.C. § 559 states that the APA rules “do not limit or
repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise
317
recognized by law.” The de novo nature of the Tax Court’s review
of deficiency determinations has been recognized law since well
318
before 1946. However, saying that APA rules do not limit or repeal
the de novo rules does not conversely say that the de novo rules limit
or repeal APA rules, which is the question at hand.
Third, 5 U.S.C. § 703 provides: “The form of proceeding for
judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to
319
the subject matter in a court specified by statute . . . .” Tax Court
litigation is the special statutory review proceeding specified for
320
deficiency determinations under I.R.C. § 6213. However, to say that

314. See, e.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 996 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Tax Court is a ‘reviewing court’ for purposes of the judicial review provisions of the
APA.”).
315. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(1) (2012).
316. See H.R .REP. NO. 79-1980, at 45 (1946); S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 28 (1945).
317. 5 U.S.C. § 559.
318. E.g., Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589, 598 (1931); Blair v. Oesterlein Mach. Co., 17
F.2d 663, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
319. 5 U.S.C. § 703.
320. I.R.C. § 6213(a).
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this is the form of the proceeding does not define the contents of the
proceeding. In this way, 5 U.S.C. § 703 does not foreclose the
possibility that § 706 standards could be employed as part of the
321
proceeding.
Fourth, 5 U.S.C. § 704 states that judicial review extends to
“[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action
322
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” “[T]he
primary thrust of § 704 was to codify the exhaustion [of
administrative remedies] requirement,” but § 704 “also makes it clear
that Congress did not intend the general grant of review in the APA
323
to duplicate existing procedures for review of agency action.” In
various nontax cases, the availability of express, adequate remedies
324
has been sufficient reason to reject APA remedies.
Similar
reasoning—although not always specifically linked to the APA—has
325
sometimes appeared in tax cases. In our context, however, no
duplication of procedures would be necessary. The same Tax Court
or refund proceedings that are available now would still be used. The
court would just have an additional option: invalidating the deficiency
notice for explanatory insufficiency without needing to reach the
substantive merits of the adjustments in the notice.
Fifth, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) allows “[t]he reviewing court” to “hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions”
found deficient under any of six standards, one being the arbitrary326
and-capricious standard, another being “without observance of
327
procedure required by law,” and another being “unwarranted by
the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the
328
reviewing court.” One possible reading is that when the Tax Court
conducts de novo proceedings, it is not operating outside of the APA
329
but instead is operating within § 706(2)(F), and that the six
321. See Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 54 (2004) (Thornton, J., concurring) (agreeing that
“in appropriate circumstances, [the Tax Court should] borrow principles of judicial review
embodied in the APA”), rev’d on other grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006).
322. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
323. Brown v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988).
324. E.g., Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005).
325. E.g., Clapp v. Comm’r, 875 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1989); Scar v. Comm’r, 814 F.2d
1363, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) (Hall, J., dissenting).
326. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
327. Id. § 706(2)(D).
328. Id. § 706(2)(F).
329. See, e.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 1003 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J.,
dissenting); Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 61 (2004) (Halpern & Holmes, J.J., dissenting), rev’d
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standards in § 706(2) are cumulative, not exclusive. On this reading,
a court considering IRS deficiency determinations could employ an
arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review under § 706(2)(A) within
the context of a proceeding that is de novo under § 706(2)(F). If this
reading is accepted, there is no necessary incompatibility as to
simultaneous application of the two standards.
In short, courts often say that the de novo nature of Tax Court
deficiency proceedings preempts arbitrary-and-capricious review, but
none of the potentially applicable statutes command such an outcome
by plain language. Construction is necessary, and it is to construction
that this Article now turns.
b. Construction. If the statutory text does not compel an answer,
what is the better construction? There are arguments in favor of
allowing APA analysis to supplement traditional tax analysis. For
example, Congress intended the APA to “cover a broad spectrum of
administrative actions,” and the Supreme Court has held that the
APA’s “generous review provisions must be given a hospitable
331
interpretation.” Moreover, the Court has stressed “the importance
of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of
administrative action . . . . The APA was meant to bring uniformity to
a field full of variation and diversity. It would frustrate that purpose
332
to permit divergence on the basis of [mere ambiguity].”
However, this policy is no Procrustean bed. In the Supreme
Court’s seminal decision in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education
333
& Research v. United States, a unanimous Court suggested that
context-specific deviations from general principles of administrative
334
law are permissible when justification exists. There are reasons to

on other grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Porter v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 131 n.3
(2008) (Thornton, J., concurring) (criticizing the view of Judges Halpern and Holmes).
330. E.g., Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284
(1974); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
331. Brown v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 904 (1988) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967)) (quotation marks omitted); see Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S.
48, 51 (1955).
332. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1999).
333. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
334. See id. at 713 (“[The taxpayer] has not advanced any justification for applying a
[different standard] to Treasury Department regulations than we apply to the rules of any other
agency. In the absence of such justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach to
administrative review good for tax law only.”).
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construe the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard as being
inapplicable to de novo review of deficiency and cognate
determinations.
First, although no single APA section described above is
conclusive, their cumulative impact should be considered. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that construction involves
335
considering “the overall statutory scheme” to reconcile statutes, to
336
“get[] them to ‘make sense’ in combination.” In this spirit, “[t]he
337
provisions of the [APA] must be read and construed together.”
Read in concert, the above near-miss sections of the APA suggest a
direction that is more felicitous to the O’Dwyer view than hostile to it.
Second, the deficiency litigation regime has been defined
through statutes, court rules, and case law over generations. This
comprehensive set of rules contrasts with the generality of the
arbitrary-and-capricious standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). It is a
“well-established principle that, in most contexts, a precisely drawn,
338
detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.” Therefore, this
comprehensive set of rules should preempt an APA–style explanation
here.
Third, as always, context must be considered. As seen in Part I.F,
otherwise inadequate explanations are acceptable when it is clear
339
what the ultimate result would be in the situation. There are areas
340
in which the IRS has discretion. However, in deficiency cases, the
outcome usually depends not on policy choices made by the IRS, but
341
on rules established by statute or Treasury regulations. In most

335. Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350, 1357 (2012) (quoting Davis v. Mich.
Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)) (quotation marks omitted).
336. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988); see FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000); Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 76–79 (D.D.C.
2013), aff’d, No. 13-5061, 2014 WL 519224 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 2014).
337. O’Dwyer v. Comm’r, 266 F.2d 575, 580 (4th Cir. 1959).
338. Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501, 506 (2007) (quoting EC Term of Years Trust v.
United States, 550 U.S. 429, 434 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted).
339. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
340. E.g., I.R.C. § 446(b) (2012) (deviations from normal accounting method); id. § 481
(adjustments on account of changes in accounting method); id. § 1362(f)(4) (adjustments on
account of inadvertent invalid S-corporation elections and terminations).
341. When the relevant provision is clear, Treasury and the IRS have “no power to amend it
[even] by regulation.” Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 447 (1936); see also Swallows
Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96, 129 (2006) (“[T]he authority delegated to the
Secretary . . . is not limitless and, if exercised improperly, may usurp the role of Congress . . . .”),
rev’d on other grounds, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008). Treasury often has considerable freedom in
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deficiency cases, therefore, arbitrary-and-capricious review should
have limited purchase.
2. Section 7522. As seen in Part III.A.1, I.R.C. § 7522 requires
the IRS to explain the basis of adjustments set out in notices of
342
deficiency. Such explanations are less complete than explanations
343
under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard might require.
Nonetheless, Congress expressly provided that “[a]n inadequate
description under [§ 7522] shall not invalidate [the notice of
344
deficiency].” Short of invalidation, the Tax Court has held that
shifting the burden of proof to the IRS is an appropriate remedy for
345
violation of § 7522.
Section 7522’s “no invalidation for inadequate description”
direction strongly argues against applying APA–style reasoned346
explanation analysis to IRS deficiency determinations. Invalidating
a notice of deficiency because of its descriptive insufficiency would be
precisely what Congress said that it did not want to happen.
A possible rejoinder involves 5 U.S.C. § 559, which provides:
“Subsequent statute may not be held to supersede or modify [various
APA sections, including § 706] except to the extent that it does so
347
expressly.” I.R.C. § 7522 was enacted after the 5 U.S.C. § 706, and
348
the former section does not refer expressly to the latter section.
But it would be a mistake to take the language in § 559 at face
value. Express language is one of several devices by which previous
legislatures attempt to entrench their work against change by later
legislatures. But at a certain point, entrenchment becomes
constitutionally dubious. It is fundamental that “one legislature

how it writes a regulation. Once the regulation has been finalized, however, it binds the IRS and
taxpayers alike.
342. See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 190–95 and accompanying text.
344. See I.R.C. § 7522(a) (Any notice to which this section applies shall describe the basis
for, and identify the amounts (if any) of, the tax due, interest, additional amounts, additions to
the tax, and assessable penalties included in such notice. An inadequate description under the
preceding sentence shall not invalidate such notice.” (emphasis added)).
345. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
346. See I.R.C. § 7522(a).
347. 5 U.S.C. § 559.
348. Compare Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 6233, 102 Stat. 3735, 3735 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7522), with Administrative
Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 10, 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706).
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cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.” Thus, a
prescription indicating that a later enactment can have effect only if it
350
expressly refers to the APA is of questionable legitimacy.
Accordingly, despite occasional overly exuberant remarks in
351
some cases, language such as that in § 559 does not create an
absolute rule of law but operates only as a “background canon[] of
352
interpretation of which Congress is presumptively aware.” A later
statute may overcome an entrenchment attempt “either expressly or
353
by necessary implication.” A “fair implication” in the later statute
354
355
can suffice. Specifically, in Marcello v. Bonds, the Supreme Court
refused “to require Congress to employ magical passwords in order to
effectuate an exemption from the [APA],” and it held that a later
statute impliedly exempted deportation hearings from APA
356
procedures despite § 559’s “expressly” language.
The necessary, fair, indeed inescapable implication of
I.R.C. § 7522 is that Congress does not want notices of deficiency to
be invalidated because of explanatory shortcomings. Congress’s
intent trumps 5 U.S.C. § 559 and defeats the possible application of
the APA’s reasoned-explanation analysis to IRS deficiency
determinations.
V. REASONED EXPLANATION AS TO OTHER IRS DETERMINATIONS
For the reasons set out in Part IV above, the case is quite strong
for not applying the APA’s reasoned-explanation requirement to
deficiency determinations. The balance of considerations is different
as to other types of IRS adjudication, however, resulting in different
levels of confidence and even different conclusions.
349. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810).
350. See generally Amandeep S. Grewal, Legislative Entrenchment Rules in Tax Law, 62
ADMIN L. REV. 1011 (2010).
351. See, e.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dissenting)
(“Exceptions to the APA may not be inferred, but must be express . . . .”). But see Robinette v.
Comm’r, 439 U.S. 455, 460 (8th Cir. 2006) (taking a less committal view of the matter).
352. Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). But see 2
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.1, at 772 (4th ed. 2002) (“The
majority [opinion in Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999),] . . . seemed to establish a
presumption in favor of uniformity in standards for judicial review of agency actions that can be
overcome only by ‘clear’ evidence in support of a departure.”).
353. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908).
354. Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 660 n.10 (1974).
355. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
356. Id. at 310.
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A. Jeopardy and Termination Determinations
The § 7522 argument, which, as shown, is strong in the deficiency
context, appears at first blush not to apply in jeopardy and
termination situations. Jeopardy and termination notifications are not
among the vehicles listed in § 7522(b), and, unlike the deficiency
357
procedures that date back to the 1920s, § 7429 was enacted in 1976,
thirty years after the enactment of the APA.
Could an argument be made, however, that § 7429 is so linked to
the deficiency process that it is within the penumbra of § 7522? The
358
spousal relief rules of § 6015 were enacted in 1998 —although a
predecessor of § 6015 had roots in the 1970s. Nonetheless, some
judges have stated that § 6015 is part and parcel of the deficiency
process and, therefore, should be viewed as outside the reach of the
359
APA.
But that approach has been criticized even in the § 6015
360
context, and such an argument would be even more of a stretch in
the jeopardy-and-termination context. Spousal relief decisions under
§ 6015 are part of the process of determining liability, as are
deficiency determinations. As seen in Part II.B, jeopardy and
termination decisions do not determine liability. They merely freeze
the status quo to preserve collection potential should the IRS
eventually prevail. The merits of the liability determination come
later, in independent Tax Court or refund proceedings.
Despite the unavailability of a § 7522 argument, the balance of
considerations favors not applying APA–style reasoned-explanation
analysis to IRS jeopardy and termination assessments. First, the
extraordinary need for expedition in jeopardy and termination cases
makes adding an extra level of procedure unwise. Second, there is
little need for the addition of a new analysis. The IRS’s issuance of
large numbers of notifications merely parroting the statutory
language is a practice that is decades in the past. Should the bad old
357. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, § 1204(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1695 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 7429 (2012)).
358. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206,
§ 3201, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6015).
359. E.g., Comm’r v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1273 (11th Cir. 2009); Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C.
32, 52 (2004) (Thornton, J., concurring), rev’d on other grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006).
360. E.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 1003 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dissenting);
see Ewing, 122 T.C. at 64 n.11 (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., dissenting) (“[W]e emphatically do not
agree that sec. 6015 is ‘part and parcel’ of the ‘specific statutory framework for reviewing
deficiency determinations . . . .’” (quoting id. at 52 (Thorton, J., concurring))).
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days return, courts have established a context-specific explanation
361
duty, rendering an APA explanation duty unnecessary. Third, when
courts choose not to invoke that tax-specific duty, it is because the
362
taxpayer suffered no substantial prejudice. The harmless-error rule
is a recognized exception to the APA’s reasoned-explanation
363
requirement. In the area of IRS adjudication, the rule has been
applied most often in jeopardy and termination cases, and it serves
well in this context. It would be wrong to exempt all IRS
adjudications from reasoned-explanation analysis based on blanket
assertion of harmless error. Harmless error is a narrow rule to be
364
applied on a case-by-case basis rather than categorically, and this is
how it has been used in the jeopardy-and-termination context.
B. CDP Determinations
1. Collection Issues. Collection is involved in most issues in CDP
hearings, such as whether the IRS has taken the right procedural
steps for collection and whether less harsh collection alternatives
exist. The balance of considerations favors allowing APA–style
reasoned-explanation analysis for CDP collection issues.
The legal arguments counseling a different outcome in the
deficiency context do not operate as to CDP collection issues. The
365
CDP regime was added to the I.R.C. in 1998. CDP notices of
determination are not mentioned in § 7522, and CDP was a distinct
366
innovation, not part and parcel of the deficiency process. Harmless-

361. See supra notes 198–203 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 38, 126–27 and accompanying text.
364. See, e.g., Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407 (2009) (warning against “the use of
mandatory presumptions and rigid rules rather than case-specific application of judgment” in
reviewing the harmless-error framework the Federal Circuit applied to decisions by the
Department of Veterans Affairs); Sugar Cane Grower Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89,
96 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting a broad harmless-error claim that “would have us virtually repeal”
a part of the APA, and adding that “an utter failure to comply with [an APA requirement]
cannot be considered harmless if there is any uncertainty at all as to the effect of that failure”).
Some moderation of the traditional rule may be developing. See, e.g., Shinseki, 565 U.S. at 411
(acknowledging that “courts may sometimes make empirically based generalizations about what
kinds of errors are likely, as a factual matter, to prove harmful”); Smith, supra note 38, at 1729
(observing that, although case-by-case inquiry has been the norm, patterns of application have
started to develop).
365. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
366. Cf. supra note 359 and accompanying text.
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error analysis is far less prominent in CDP than in jeopardy-andtermination review.
At the level of policy, as seen in Part IV.A.2.e, one major
concern in the deficiency context is that invalidation of the notice of
deficiency on explanation grounds would leave the IRS unable to
proceed because of expiration of the statute of limitations on
assessment. But CDP collection issues arise after the tax already has
been assessed, and the IRS has ample time to effect collection: at
367
least ten years. Moreover, the scope of IRS discretion typically is
greater in collection than in deficiency contexts.
In short, neither legal compulsion nor policy exigencies operate
in CDP collection determinations to the degree they do in deficiency
determinations. As to collection issues in CDP, there is insufficient
warrant to depart from broad and uniform application of the APA.
2. Liability Issues. Liability issues sometimes are considered at
CDP hearings. Section 6015 spousal relief issues may be considered,
as well as the merits of the underlying liabilities “if the person did not
receive any statutory notice of deficiency . . . or did not otherwise
368
have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability.” This context
presents a weaker case for preemption of APA analysis than does the
deficiency determination context, but a stronger case for this analysis
than does the CDP collection issues context. Revenue exigencies do
not operate strongly because CDP hearings come after the tax
already has been assessed.
Perhaps most compelling is the incongruity that would exist were
deficiency decisions under CDP to be treated more favorably for
taxpayers than deficiency decisions outside of CDP. For example, in
one case, the IRS properly sent a sixty-day letter (notifying the
369
taxpayer of § 6672 liability) to the target’s home. There, it was
signed for by the target’s twenty-three-year-old son, who (in the best
tradition of adolescence) threw the letter “somewhere” in the
370
basement instead of giving it to his father. The court held that the
target had not had a prior opportunity, so it allowed him to contest
371
the § 6672 merits in the CDP hearing. The Tax Court also has held

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

I.R.C. § 6502(a) (2012).
Id. §§ 6330(c)(2)(A)(i), (B).
Lepore v. Comm’r, No. 11698-11L, 2013 WL 2359486, at *1 (T.C. May 30, 2013).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
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that taxpayers who allegedly overstated their liabilities on the returns
372
they filed can dispute those liabilities in CDP hearings.
If the APA–style reasoned-explanation requirement were to
apply to liability issues in CDP hearings—but not in the normal
deficiency process—parents of irresponsible offspring would have
greater procedural protections than parents of responsible offspring.
And taxpayers who file inaccurate returns and then enter the CDP
process would have greater protections than those in deficiency and
refund proceedings. It would be fairer to subject taxpayers to the
same procedures whether their liability issues are contested in
deficiency proceedings, refund proceedings, or CDP hearings. For, as
shown in Part IV, the APA’s reasoned-explanation requirement
should not be applied to liabilities determined in deficiency cases,
neither should it be applied to liabilities in CDP hearings. This
approach would result in two sets of rules being applied in the same
CDP case: the APA’s reasoned-explanation requirement would apply
to collection issues but would not apply to liability issues in the same
373
CDP case. But this result would be tolerable.
C. Trust Fund Recovery Penalty Determinations
Explanations in sixty-day letters present yet another
concatenation of considerations. Section 6672 is actually a collection
374
device, a fact that normally diminishes the need to preempt APA
analysis. However, § 6672 liability must be assessed before it can be
collected. The IRS must assess § 6672 liabilities against the
responsible persons within three years of the filing of the return that
375
has given rise to the unpaid liability. That being so, the statute-oflimitations-based concern about loss of revenue from reasonedexplanation remands would operate in the § 6672 context. This
concern—coupled with the infrequency of complaints about
inadequately descriptive sixty-day letters and the existence of a
harmless-error line of cases in the area—should tip the balance
against applying APA–style reasoned-explanation requirements to
sixty-day letters.

372. Montgomery v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 1, 2 (2004), acq., 2005-2 C.B. 1152.
373. A different split rule, distinguishing between liability and collection issues, already
exists in the CDP context. CDP liability decisions are reviewed de novo, whereas CDP
collection decisions are reviewed deferentially. E.g., Goza v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 176, 181 (2000).
374. See supra note 170.
375. See supra note 300.
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D. Other IRS Adjudications
The considerations discussed in Parts IV and V might be useful
in resolving questions about the application of explanation
requirements to IRS adjudications outside the four paradigms
explored in this Article. The case for such application is likely to be
stronger in collection than in liability contexts and in situations in
which a statute of limitations imposes no special need for expedition.
In contrast, the case for application is likely to be weaker when a
long-established and carefully detailed tradition of rigorous review
exists, when the IRS has little discretion in applying the substantive
rules, when skimpy explanations are likely to be harmless, when taxspecific explanation rules already operate with some vigor, or when a
practice of substantial explanation already prevails.
CONCLUSION
Commentators, including Professors Kristin Hickman and
Leandra Lederman, have rightfully decried the tendency of tax
professionals to consider “tax law an island, apart from all other
376
bodies of law.” But our objection should be to mindless calls for
parochial difference. The tradition of American administrative law is
sensitivity to context, not straitjacketing or lock-step conformity.
Reflecting this tradition, this Article has considered whether
reasoned-explanation analysis under the APA’s arbitrary-andcapricious standard should be added as a further level of review of
IRS adjudicative decisions. The Article concludes that this would be a
bad idea for deficiency determinations and would probably be a bad
idea in the contexts of jeopardy and termination determinations, trust
fund recovery penalty determinations, and CDP liability
determinations. Nevertheless, it would be a good idea for CDP
collection determinations, and, pending particularized analysis, might
be a good idea as to some other types of IRS adjudications.
It is apparent from the foregoing that there are many difficult
issues in reconciling the APA’s reasoned-explanation requirement

376. Lane, supra note 233, at 166; see also Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let
Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518 (1994) (noting the “myth
that tax law is somehow different from other areas of the law”); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need
for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1542
(2006) (arguing that “tax does not have, has never had, and should not have its own unique
deference tradition”); Lederman, supra note 184, at 183 (describing the tendency as “tax
insularity”).
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with IRS adjudication. But the issues relating to them are one part of
scores, probably hundreds, of areas of potential controversy that arise
from the recent short-run marriage of tax and administrative law. To
paraphrase Glen Campbell, there’ll be a load of compromisin’ on the
377
road to our tax horizon
before these newlyweds gradually,
sometimes painfully, learn the principles of successful cohabitation.

377. Cf. GLEN CAMPBELL, Rhinestone Cowboy, on RHINESTONE COWBOY (Capitol
Records 1975).

